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Chapter 4
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
TOPIC A.
TITLE I.

JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS

JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS IN GENERAL

Section 79. General Requirement of Jurisdiction.
A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction over a person
unless, in accordance with the principles stated in Sections 82 to 99, he is
subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
Comments.
a. In this Chapter judicial action of courts alone is considered, not the
exercise by a court of executive or legislative functions. A state exercises
jurisdiction through its courts over a person by creating, through the judgment
or decree of its courts, rights against the person, under which the principles of
the common law will be recognized as valid in other states.
In this Chapter, jurisdiction of courts over individuals, including unincorporated associations, is first considered; then jurisdiction of courts over
corporations.
b. In the absence of constitutional limitations, the legislature of a state
may direct its courts to render a judgment against a person not subject to the
jurisdiction of the state, and such a judgment will be valid in the state in which
it is rendered; but other states will not recognize such a judgment as valid.
c. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, the rendition of a judgment by a court of a State against a person over
whom the State has no jurisdiction is invalid even in the State in which it is
rendered.
d. The bases upon which a state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over persons are considered in Sections 82 to 99.
e. In the absence of all of these bases, a state cannot exercise through
its courts jurisdiction over a person although he has knowledge of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard.
f. In the absence of all these bases, a state cannot exercise through its
courts jurisdiction over a person Llthough he has property within the state.
It can exercise jurisdictions over the property in accordance with the principles
stated in Sections 104 to 115.
illustration:
1. A brings an action against B in a court of state X, to quiet title
to land in X. B is not personally subject to the jurisdiction of X. In
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accordance with a statute of X, B is served with process by publication
of a summons in a newspaper. B fails to appear. The court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment against B for the costs of the action.
Annotation:
The law of Missouri is in accord with Section 79, which states the negative side of the
subject of jurisdiction. In some of the cases cited below, where the service was by publication, it is not clear whether the decisions were placed upon the ground that a non-resident,
non-consenting absentee is not subject to the jurisdiction of the state (Section 79), or upon
the ground that service by publication is not alone a sufficient method of notification under
any circumstances as a basis for the rendition of a personal judgment. (See discussion under
Sections 83 and 85). Some of the Missouri decisions can be explained on the ground that
the statute did not authorize the particular method of notification employed. It is well
settled, however, that a non-resident, non-consenting absentee is not subject to the jurisdiction of a state, regardless of the method of notification employed.
In Wilson v. Gibson, 214 Mo. App. 219, 259 S. W. 491 (1924), a personal judgment
rendered in Canada against a non-resident, non-consenting absentee was refused enforcement when suit was brought upon it in Missouri. Service in the Canadian suit was made
upon the defendant in Missouri. Although the defendant filed a motion in the original sui tthe judgment recited that the defendant did not appear in the action. Accord: Bonnet,
Brown Sales Service v. Utt, 19 S. W. (2d.) 888 (1929); Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon, 281 Mo.
72, 218 S. W. 873 (1920), 258 U. S. 603, 42 S. Ct. 271, 66 L. Ed. 758 (1922); Marx-v. Fore,
51 Mo. 69 (1872); Latimer v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 43 Mo. 105 (1868) (a corporation case);
Gilleat v. Cmp, 23 Mo. 375 (1856); Sallee v. Hays, 3 Mo. 116 (1832) Smith v. Kander, 85
Mo. App. 33 (1900); Rentschler v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 135 (1878); see Stuart v. Dickinson,
290 Mo. 516, 546, 235 S. W. 446 (1921); Barlow v. Steel, 65 Mo. 611 (1877); State ex rel.
Wallace v. Summers, 9 S. W. (2d.) 867, (Mo. App. 1928). In some cases it is not clear whether
the defendant was a non-resident or not. Winston v. Taylor, 28 Mo. 82 (1859); Daniel, v.
A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 58 Mo. App. 202 (1894).
Comment c: The law of Missouri is in accord with this comment. Givens v. Hrlow,
251 Mo. 231,158 S. W. 355 (1913); Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575 (1873); Abbottv. Sheppard,
44 Mo. 273 (1869); Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo. 415 (1861); Payne v. Brooke, 217 S. W. 595
(Mo. App. 1920); Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159 S. W. 746 (1913); Hedrix v.
Hedrix, 103 Mo. App. 40,77 S. W. 495 (1903); see State ex rel. Mclndoe v. Blair,238 Mo. 132,
142 S. W. 326 (1911); Wilson v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286 (1891).
Comment e: The Missouri decisions are in accord with this comment. In the following
cases the defendant had knowledge of the suit: Givens v. Harlow; Wilson v. Gibson; Elvins v.
Elvins; Hedrix v. Hedrix; and Rentschler v. Jamison, all of which are cited above.
Comment]: The law of Missouri is in accord Aith this comment. Givens v. Harlow;
Ellison V. Martin; Abbott u. Sheppard; and Elvins v. Elvins, cited supra.
The Missouri cases dealing with the effect of a return of summons by an officer or
appearance by an attorney for defendant are cited under Sections 82 and 88. The Missouri
statutes dealing with service of process are cited under Section 83.

Section 80. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard.
A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a

person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, unless a method
of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him know]--

edge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard.

Comments:
a. In the absence of constitutional limitations, the legislature of a state
may direct its courts to render judgment against a person without any rorm of
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notification, and such a judgment will be valid in the state in which it is
rendered; but such a proceeding is not a judicial proceeding and other states
will not recognize such a judgment as valid (see Section 78).
b. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, the rendition of a judgment by the courts of a State without any
proper form of notification is invalid even in the State in which it is rendered.
c. It is not necessary that the person against whom the judgment is
rendered should have received knowledge of the action in which the judgment
is rendered. It is sufficient that steps were taken which under all the circumstances were reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action and an
opportunity to be heard.
Illustration:
1. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in X but is temporarily absent from the state. In accordance with a
statute B is served with process by leaving a summons at his usual place
of abode in X, with an adult member of his family. B does not receive
the summons and has no knowledge of its existence. The court has
jurisdiction over B.
d. A method of notification which may be sufficient if no other method
obviously better calculated to give knowledge is practicable, is unreasonable and therefore insufficient if another and obviously better method of
notification is practicable.
Illustration:
2. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
and present in X, and personal service of process might be made upon
him without difficulty. Service by proclamation at the courthouse door
is insufficient.
e. A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction over a person
although he is notified of the proceeding unless he is also given an opportunity
to be heard.
Illustrations:
3. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. Process is
served upon B in X. B appears and files an answer. The court orders
the appearance and answer struck out on the ground that B is a rebel,
and renders judgment by default. The judgment is invalid.
4. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in X but is absent in a distant state, Y. B is served with process by
personally handing him the summons in Y. Judgment is rendered
against B by default on the day following that on which he was served
with process and before he had an opportunity to appear and answer.
The judgment is invalid.
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Annotation:
The law of Missouri is in accord with the general proposition stated in Section 80.
Comment b: If a judgment is rendered by a court of another state, without any form of
notification, such judgment will not be enforced when suit is brought upon it in Missouri.
Eager v.Stover, 59 Mo. 87 (1875); Sevier v. Roddie, 51 Mo. 580 (1873); Overstreel and Overstreet v. Shannon, 1 Mo. 529 (1825); Chamber/inv Faris,1 Mo. 517 (1825); Crone v.Dawson,
19 Mo. App. 214 (1885). Nor is such a judgment valid in the state where rendered. Ray
County v. Barr, 57 Mo. 290 (1874). In some of these cases the defendant was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the state (Section 79), but the decisions were placed upon the ground
that the rendition of a judgment by the courts of a state without any form of notification is
invalid. There can be no doubt in this country that the requirement of reasonable notice is
made obligatory by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cloud v. Inhabitants ol Pierce City,
86 Mo. 357, 366 (1885).
Comment c: The law of Missouri is in accord with this comment. In the following cases
it seems that the defendant did not receive the summons. Wagoner v.Wagoner, 287 Mo.
567, 229 S. W. 1064 (1921); Hamill v. T dbot, 72 Mo. App. 22 (1897), 81 Mo. App. 210
(1899); Corby v.Wright, 4 Mo. App. 443 (1877). In Corby v.Wright, the court cited with
approval the case of Struges v.Fay, 16 Ind. 429 (1861), which is the very case stated in
Comment c, Illuvtration 1. Cf. State ex rel Fabrico v. Trimble, 309 Mo. 415, 274 S. W. 712
(1925); Barney v.White, 46 Mo. 137 (1870).
In some of the cases cited above the defendant was absent from the state at the time
of the service. As to the effect of such absence, see Section 85.
Comment d: No Missouri cases have been found involving this point. The Missouri
statutes dealing with service of process are cited under Section 83. As to service by publication see Sections 83 and 85. It must be remembered that the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States are final upon the question of what methods of notification are reasonable.
Comment e: Although there is very little direct authority in Missouri on this point
there can be no doubt in this country that this requirement is made obligatory by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Hosey v.Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 17 S. Ct. 841, 42 L. Ed. 215. In
Davidson v.Life In.urance Co., 151 Mo. App. 561, 564, 132 S.W. 291, the court mentioned
the very case stated in Illustration3. The court said: "So, in keeping with this construction
of the constitutional provision in question, it has been decided that although a party has
been duly notified of the proceedings against him, a court has not the power to condemn
him after striking out his answer, since this is tantamount to condemnation without notice
or hearing. Hosey v.Elliott, 167 U. S.409). And the same view is stated where, on notice
by publication, the party appeared and subsequently his appearance was stricken out and
his right to appear denied and his property condemned, it was held to be ajudgment without
a hearing. (Windson s. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274)."
R. S. Mo., 1929, Sec. 927, provides that if a party shall neglect to obey an order for the
production of books, papers, etc., the court may non-suit him, or strike out any answer, or
punish him for contempt. In connection with this statute, see Stimson v.Mining & Smelting
Co., 264 Mo. 190, 174 S.W. 420 (1914). R. S. Mo., 1929, Sec. 1730, provides that if a party
on being duly summoned, refuse to testify, his petition, answer or reply may be rejected.
See the following cases which apply Sec. 1730: Tyson s. Savings & Loan Ass'n., 156 Mo.
588, 57 S. W. 740 (1900); Larimore v. Babb, 114 Mo. 446, 21 S.W. 922 (1893); Snyder, v.
Raab, 40 Mo. 166 (1867); Haskell u. Sullivan, 31 Mo. 435 (1862); Coburn v.Tucker, 21 Mo.
219 (1855); Dustin v.Farrelly, 81 Mo. App. 380 (1899); Royer & Harwood s. German, 48
Mo. App. 510 (1892); Carr v. Dawes, 46 Mo. App. 351 (1890). It has been held that such
statutes are constitutional. Hammond Packing Co. v.Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 29 S. Ct.
370, 53 L. Ed. 530 (1908); Miles v.Armour, 239 Mo. 438, 144 S.W. 424 (1912).

Section 81. Continuance of Jurisdiction.
If a court obtains jurisdiction over a party to an action, that jurisdiction
continues throughout all subsequent proceedings in the action.

MISSOURI ANNOTATIONS

Comments:
a. The jurisdiction of a court over a defendant in an action one acquired
continues as to all proceedings arising out of the original cause of action, but
unless the defendant has appeared in the action it does not extend to different
causes of action not included in the original action.
Illustration:
1. A brings an action against B in a court ot state X, alleging that
B beat A. B is personally served with process in X. B fails to appear.
Subsequently A amends his complaint by adding a count for slander. The
court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment against B for the slander.
b. An appearance by the defendant in the action may subject him to
the jurisdiction of the court as to proceedings in the action not arising out of the
original cause of action (see Section 88, Comment c).
Annotation:
Se- eral Missouri decisions seem to recognize the general proposition stated in Section
81. Thus in the case of In re Condemnation oJ Property, etc., 263 S. W. 97 (Mo. 1924) (a
condemnation suit), it was said that one having been duly summoned into court for a particular purpose is required to take notice of all subsequent proceedings until the purpose is
accomplished or until the action is disposed of or until the party is otherwise discharged
according to law. As to the effect of a final judgment, see Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S.
141, 27 Sup. Ct. 434, 51 L. Ed. 745 (1907); Clancy v.. Herman C. G. Luyties Realty Co., 321
Mo. 282, 10 S. W. (2d) 914 (1928); Collison v. Norman, 191 S. W. 60 (Mo. 1916) (tax judgment); Roberts v. St. Louis Merchants' Land Improvement Co., 126 Mo. 460, 29 S. W. 584
(1895) (partition suit); Ekonomou v. Greek Orthodox Church, 280 S. W. 57 (Mo. App. 1926);
Konta v. St. Louis Stock Exchange, 150 Mo. App. 617, 131 S. W. 380 (1910); Pulitzer Pub.
Co. v. Allen, 134 Mo. App. 229, 113 S. W. 1159 (1908); Laun v. Ponath, 91 Mo. App. 271
(1902) (action to foreclose deed of trust); Smith v. Kander, 85 Mo. App. 33 (1900).
In Missouri a petition cannot be amended, even under the liberal provisions of the code,
so as to state an entirely different cause of action from the one declared on in the original
petition. And it seems that such an amendment will not be permitted even if the defendant
appeared in the action before the petition was amended. Heman v. Glann, 129 Mo. 325, 31
S. W. 589 (1895); Turner v. St. Louis S. P. Ry. Co., 76 Mo. 261 (1882); Meyer v. Glick,
295 S. W. 844 (Mo. App. 1927); Criswell v. Selecman, 185 S. W. 1145 (Mo. App. 1916).
Cf. Jackson v. Fulton, 87 Mo. App. 228 (1901); City of St. Louis v. Gleason, 15 Mo. App. 25
(1884). But a party may waive the objection to such an amendment by filing a demurrer
or pleading to the merits after the amendment. Boyd v. St. Louis Brewing Assn., 318 Mo.
1206, 5 S. W. (2d) 46 (1928). A Missouri statute provides that whenever an interlocutory
judgment shall be rendered for the plaintiff by default, the damages or other relief shall not
be other or greater than that which he shall have demanded in the petition as originally
filed and served on the defendant. R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 1080; White U. McFarland, 148
Mo. App. 338, 128 S. W. 23 (1910). It would seem, therefore, that the question involved
in Comment a cannot arise in Missouri unless a court here is asked to enforce a judgment of
another state based upon facts stated in Illustration . No Missouri decisions have been
found presenting this question.

JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS
Section 82. Bases of Jurisdiction.
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(1) The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its courts over an
individual may be based upon any one of the following facts:
(a) He is personally within the state;
(b) He has his domicil within the state;
(c) He is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the state;
(d) He has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction;
(e) He has by acts done or events caused by him within the state subj ected himself to the jurisdiction.
(2) In the absence of all these bases of jurisdiction a state through its
courts cannot exercise its jurisdiction over individuals.
Comments:
a. A state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person on the ground that a
sheriff or other officer of the state makes a return falsely stating that he has
served him with process within the state. The truth of the return may be
brought in question in a court of any state.
b. These bases of jurisdiction over individuals are considered in Sections
83 to 92 inclusive.
A4nnotation:
Comment a: In determining whether the law of Missouri is in accord with this comment
it is necessary to consider (1) the Missouri rule as to the conclusiveness of a sheriff's return,
and (2) whether the Missouri decisions are consistent with this comment.
(1) In an action originally instituted in Missouri, i. e., an action not based upon a
foreign judgment, Missouri follows the common-law rule that a sheriff's return of process is
conclusive upon the parties to the suit, and is not subject to attack in the case in which
made, either before or after judgment. Also, it is not subject to attack in a collateral proceeding. This is true even when no rights of third parties are involved. In the absence of
proof of fraud on the part of the plaintiff, the only remedy of a party aggrieved by a false
return is an action against the sheriff or his sureties. See cases cited below.
The verity rule applies to the return of a constable, Jeffries v. Wright, 51 Mo. 215 (1873),
but it does not apply to the return of a private person appointed to serve a summons issued
by a justice of the peace. Jones v. Overall, 13 S. W. (2d) 581 (Mo. App. 1929); Butler Bros.
v. Cantwell, 287 S. W. 794 (Mo. App. 1926). The return may be impeached in an action
against an officer for a false return. State ex rel. Carroll v. Devitt, 107 Mo. 573, 17 S. W. 900
(1891; Stateex rel. Beckwith v. Finn, 100 Mo. 429,13 S. W. 712 (1890).
Equity will not relieve a defendant from a judgment obtained at law on a false return
of service merely on satisfactory proof that there was in fact no proper service. But equity
will grant relief on proof of fraud on the part of the plaintiff. See Ellis, v. Nuckols, 237 Mo.
290, 140 S. W. 867 (1911); Riger v. Mullins, 210 Mo. 563, 109 S. W. 26 (1908); Smoot v.
Judd, 184 Mo. 508, 83 S. W. 481 (1904); Barnett v. Barnett, 245 S. W. 579 (Mo. App. 1922);
Strobel v. Clark, 128 Mo. App. 48, 106 S. W. 585 (1907). The Missouri view as to relief in
equity was criticized in Kempnerv. Jordan, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 26 S. W. 870 (1894).
The Missouri rule is the view in a small minority of states. For a criticism of the verity
rule, see: Sunderland, The Sheriff's Return, (1916) 16 Col. L. Rev. 281; Nuttallburg Smokeless Fuel Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 89 W. Va. 438, 109 S. E. 766 (1921). In Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437, 30 S. Ct. 125, 54 L. Ed. 272 (1910), it was held that
notwithstanding the conformity act, the state rule, that a sheriff's returns is concluive,
should not be followed by Federal courts sitting in that state. See also Higham v. Iowa
State Traveller's Ass'n., 183 Fed. 845 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1911).
In each of the following cases the defendant was an individual and he did not consent
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to the exercise of jurisdiction. It does not appear, apart from the sheriff's return, (a) whether
the defendant was present in the state at the time of the alleged service, or (b) whether he
was domiciled there, or (c) whether he had by acts done or events caused by him within the
state subjected himself to jurisdiction under the principle of Secs. 90-91. In one type of case
the defendant contended that he had not been served with process, and it was held that the
sheriff's return could not be contradicted as to the fact of service. Ellis v. Nuckols, 237
Mo. 290, 140 S. W. 876 (1911) (bill in equity to set aside judgment); Reiger v. Mullins,
210 Mo.- 563, 109 S. W. 26 (1908) (like last case); Smoot v. Judd, 184 Mo. 508, 83 S. W. 481
(1904) klike last case); Jeffries v. Wright, 51 Mo. 215 (1873); Deichmann v. Hogdn, 26 S. W.
(2d) 874 (Mo. App. 1930) (motion to quash execution); Sirobel v. Clark, 128 Mo. App. 48,
106 S. W. 585 (1907) (bill in equity). In Smoot v. Judd, supra, the court also placed the
decision on other grounds. It has also been held that a sheriff's return is conslusive as to
whether the summons was left with a person of the family at the defendant's usual place of
abode within the state. Phillips v. Evans, 64 Mo. 17 (1876); Hallowell v. Page, 24 Mo. 590
(1857); see Stewart v. Stringer, 41 Mo. 400 (1876); State to the Use of Allen v. O'Neill, 4 Mo.
App. 221, 222 (1877).
In Delinger's Adm. v. Higgins, 26 Mo. 180 (1858), the defendant, a resident of the State,
waived the jurisdictional question.
In the following cases the action was not in personam: Anthony v. Bartholow, 69 Mo.
186 (1878); Magrew v. Foster, 54 Mo. 258 (1873); McDonald v. Leewrigl.t, 31 Mo. 29 (1860);
Reeves v. Reeves, 33 Mo. 28 (1862); Leavel v. Johnston, 209 Mo. App. 197, 232 S. W. 1064
(1921); Rumsey Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 35 Mo. App. 217, (1889). Cf. Decker v. Armstrong, 87
Mo. 316 (1885); Burgertv. Borchert, 59 Mo. 80 (1875).
In Barneit v. Barnett, 207 Mo. App. 683, 230 S. W. 337 (1921), 245 S. W. 579 (1922),
it was held that where a return shows proper and valid service, the defendant cannot go
behind the return on motion to quash execution and show that a copy of the summons was
not filed by the clerk and did not have the seal of the court on it. This decision may be justified on the ground that the defects mentioned were mere irregularities and could not be
reached on motion to quash execution. But it is difficult to see how the case involves the
contradiction of facts stated in the return.
(2) Are the above cited Missouri decisions inconsistent with the Restatement? According to the Restatement, if any one of the facts stated in Section 82, Subsection (1),
is established by extrinsic evidence, a state can say that an officer's return of service is
sufficient to prevent a defendant from disputing the truth of the return by direct attack
or in a collateral proceeding. The rendition of such a judgment is not a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and it would
seem that other states must give full faith and credit to such a judgment. See Meidreich v.
Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236, 34 S. Ct. 309, 58 L. Ed. 584 (1913), cited and discussed in ComMENTARIES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (Am. L. Inst.) Section 82, Comment a. On the other land, in
the absence of all the bases of jurisdiction mentioned in Section 82, subsection (I), a state
cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by means of a false recital of jurisdictional facts. That is,
a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person when the attempted exercise is based solely
upon a return of an officer falsely stating that the defendant was served with process within
the state, and a return cannot be conclusive as to whether the defendant was present,
domiciled in the state, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the state. A personal judgment based solely upon a false return is not entitled to full faith and credit in other jurisdictions, and it would seem'that such a judgment would be invalid even in the state in
which it was rendered. Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. (U. S.) 58, 22 L. Ed. 70
(1873); Commentaries on Conflict of Laws, (Am. L. Inst.) Section 82. See Mechanical
Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437, 30 S. Ct. 125, 54 L. Ed. 272 (1910) (action against
foreign corporation); Stier v. Iowa Travelling Man's Assoc., 199 Iowa 118, 201 N. W. 328
(1924) (like last case); Note, 1919) 28 Yale L. J. 579.
Although the Missouri decisions cited above hold that in actions originally instituted
in Missouri, the sheriff's return is conclusive evidence of service within the state, even as
against a direct attack, numerous cases are in accord with Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co.,
supra, holding that if an action is brought in one state upon a judgment of another state,
the defendant may attack the judgment for want of jurisdiction in the court rendering it,
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although the record of the judgment contains a recital of jurisdiction. See Annotation to
Section 490. In many of the Missouri cases holding that if an action is brought upon a
judgment of a sister state, the defendant may attack the judgment for want of jurisdiction
in the court rendering it, although the record of the judgment contains a recital of jurisdictional facts, no point is made as to the presence or domicil of the defendant in the sister
state at the time of the alleged serx ice. It would seem that if the first state follows the rule
that a sheriff's return is conclusive, and the defendant was in the state, domiciled there, or
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the state at the time of the alleged service,
other states would be required to give full faith and credit to the judgment. If the defendant
was not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the sister state, other states would not be
required to give full faith and credit to a judgment based solely upon a false return, and it
would seem that such a judgment would be invalid even in the state where rendered.
As to whether the Missouri cases involving actions originally brought in Missouri are
in accord with the Restatement, the determination of this question depends upon whether
the defendant was personally present, domiciled within the state, or otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the state at the time of the alleged service. No point was made in the Missouri cases as to the presence or domicil of the defendant, and it is impossible to determine
these important facts. It cannot be said, therefore, that any Missouri court has sustained
a personal judgment based solely upon a false sheriff's return. On the other hand, no court in
Missouri has even intimated that the Missouri doctrine is limited to defendants otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the state because of presence, domicil, etc. There is reason to
believe that the courts of Missouri are of the opinion that a valid personal judgment against
a non-resident, non-consenting, absentee can be based solely upon a sheriff's return falsely
stating that the defendant was served with process within the state. If this is the law of
Missouri, it is not in accord with the Restatement and cannot be sustained in view of the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court which are final authority on this question
Corporation Cases
The cases on jurisdiction over corporations are cited under Sections 93-99. It is convenient, however, to consider at this point the corporation cases dealing with the effect of a
false sheriff's return.
Domestic Corporation Cases: In Cornwall v. Star Bottling Co., 128 Mo. App. 163, 106
S. W. 591 (1907), the defendant was a domestic corporation. It was held that the sheriff's
return of service on an agent was conclusive as to the fact of service. In State of Mo. to Ue
of Allen, Adm. v. O'Neill, 4 Mo. App. 221, 222 (1877), the court said: "There seems to be
no good reason why the sheriff's averment that O'Neill was president of the corporation
should not be equally conclusive, even if an effort were made to show the contrary." Cf.
Heath v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 617 (1884).
A domestic corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of the state. A state can exercise
jurisdiction over its domestic corporations, provided the state employs a method of notification which is reasonably calculated to give the corporation knowledge of the action and an
opportunity to be heard. (Restatement, Section 93). If a state can say that an officer's
return of service is sufficient to prevent an individual domiciled within the state from disputing the proceeding collaterally, without violating the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution, (Meidreich v. Lauenstein, supra), it would seem that a state can render a valid
judgment against a domestic corporation although the sheriff's return of service is false.
Foreign Corporation Cases: State ex rel. Portland Cement Co. v. Sale, 232 Mo. 166, 132
S. W. 1119 (1910) and Newcomb v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 182 Mo. 687, 81 S. W. 1069 (1904),
involved actions against foreign corporations doing business in Missouri. In both cases it was
said that the defendant waived the jurisdictional question. But it was also said that the
sheriff's return was conclusive as to whether the person served was the agent of the corporation. In Elliott v. Wabash R. Co., 208 Mo. App. 348, 234 S. W. 520 (1925), an action
to enforce an attorney's lien was brought against a foreign corporation doing business in
Missouri. The defendant contended that the process served in the cause was not served
upon an agent of the defendant. Held, that "even though the return of the sheriff showing
service on the defendant was false, it is conclusive upon the parties to the suit and their
privies." (p. 357). (Decision reversed on other grounds, 261 U. S. 457, 43 S. Ct. 406, 67
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L. Ed. 743 (1923). In FraternalBankers of 4mer. v. Wire, 150 Mo. App. 89, 129 S. W. 765
(1910), the defendant, a foreign corporation, offered to show on a petition for review of the
judgment, that the person served was not its agent. Held, (1) that the return was conclusive
as to whether the person served was the agent of the corporation and (2) that in any event
the defendant could not raise the question by petition for review. In Regent Realty Co. v.
Armour Packing Co., 112 Mo. App. 271, 86 S. W. 880 (1905), it was also held that an officer's
return is conclusive as to whether the person served was the agent of the defendant.
Although some of these cases can be explained on the ground that the defendant waived
the jurisdictional question, or failed to raise the question in the proper manner, the cases
indicate that Missouri follows the rule that an officer's return is conclusive as to whether
the person served was an agent of the foreign corporation. There is also some intimation
that a return is conclusive as to the fact of doing business within the state. If this is the law
of Missouri it cannot be sustained.
A state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation unless the corporation
has by consenting to the exercise of jurisdiction or by entering an appearance or by doing
business within the state subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the state. (Restatement,
Section 95). If it is established by extrinsic evidence that a foreign corporation is doing business within the state, so that it is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the state, perhaps
the state can say that an officer's return of service is sufficient to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction. But the question of whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the
state is not one of local or statutory construction; it is one of due process of law, and the
Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter. Philadelphia& Reading Ry. Co. v.
Mc Kibbin, 243 U. S. 264; Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760 (1927).
If a foreign corporation has not done business within the state or has not otherwise subjected
itself to the jurisdiction of the state, it is difficult to see how a state can exercise jurisdiction
over it, when such action is based upon the return of an officer falsely stating that the corporation was doing business within the state.
A statute may provide that if a foreign corporation does engage in business within the
state, service may be made uponlone of its agents. (Restatement, Section 98). In addition to
the requirement that a foreign corporation must be doing business in the state, it is necessary
to constitute due process, that the service be made upon some agent so far representing it
that he may properly be held in law its agents to receive process in its behalf. St. Clair v.
Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882). It would seem, therefore, that a
sheriff's return cannot be conclusive as to whether the person served represented the corporation in such capacity as to authorize service on him. In Stier v. Travelling Men's Assoc.,
199 Iowa 118, 201 N. W. 328 (1924), the plaintiff brought an action in Iowa to enforce a
Missouri judgment obtained against the defendant, an Iowa corporation. By answer, the
defendant denied that the Missouri court had acquired any jurisdiction over it because (1)
the person served was not its agent, and (2) the defendant was not doing business in Missouri.
The record did not show that the defendant had appeared in the Missouri action, but it
contained a copy of the summons and return stating that the sheriff had served defendant by
leaving a copy of the summons and petition "at the business office" of the corporation
"with P. T. Bohan, an examining physician of the defendant corporation, and person in
charge of said business office." The Missouri judgment recited that the defendant had been
duly served with process. The Iowa court held that the defendant's evidence showed that
the person served was not the defendant's agent and refused to enforce the Missouri judgment. If the defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Missouri court it would
seem that thejudgment would be void even in Missouri. See Higham v. Iowa State Traveller's
Ass'n., 183 Fed. 845 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1911).
Comment b: The Missouri authorities appear in the sections following where individual
instances of exercise of jurisdiction are considered.

Section 83.

Individual Voluntarily Within the State.

A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual
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within its territory whether he is permanently or only temporarily there,
except as stated in Section 45.
Comments:
a. Over some persons within the state, principles of international law
which have been accepted as part of the common law, or constitutional
provisions, or some treaty or other formal act to which the state is a party,
prevents the exercise of jurisdiction (see Section 45). These limitations are
not considered in the Restatement of this Subject.
The limitation of a state's power over ambassadors is an important limitation not discussed.
b. At common law the jurisdiction of a court over a person is obtained
by personal service upon him within the state.
c. If a statute authorizes a different method of service upon a person
within the state, although only temporarily there, a judgment rendered after
such service is valid and will be recognized in other states as valid, if the method
is one reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action and an
opportunity to be heard.
Illustration:
1. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in and a citizen of state Y, but is stopping at a hotel in X. In accordance
with a statute, process is served upon B by mail, the process being duly
received by B at the hotel. The court hasjurisdiction over B.
d. A statute may validly provide for service of process upon a person
residing within the state, though not domiciled therein, by leaving the process
at his residence, under circumstances reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard, although he is outside
the state at the time the process is left at his residence, provided he subsequently returns to the state. The jurisdiction of the state becomes effective
when he returns to the state, and is based not upon h*s residence but upon
his presence within the state. Residence alone without domicil or presence
is not a sufficient basis of jurisdiction.
Illustration:
2. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in state Y, but is residing temporarily at the home of his parents in X.
In accordance with a statute, a summons is left with his father at his
parents' home. B was at the time out of X but returned a few days
later. The court has jurisdiction over B.
e. At common Lw a state does not in civil cases exercise jurisdiction
over a non-resident brought into the state by fraud of the plaintiff, or coming
in voluntarily as a witness in or a party to a judicial proceeding, unless he
remains in the state after having a reasonable opportunity to leave the state
or otherwise waives his privilege not to be sued; although a state can exercise
jurisdiction over such a person.
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The rule under which the court refuses to exercise jurisdiction, while a
common-law principle, is not a principle of jurisdiction. If the courts of a
state, on their own initiative or in obedience to a statute, in the absence or
constitutional limitations, disregard the principle and exercise jurisdiction,

the rights created by such action will be recognized as valid by the courts
of other states.
Annotation:
The law of Missouri is in accord with Section 83. Under the Missouri statutes cited
below, a Missouri .court cannot render a personal judgment against an individual, in the
absence of consent or appearance, unless (1) the individual is personally served with process
within the state, or (2) a copy of the petition and writ is left at his usual place of abode
within the state with some person or member of the family over the age of fifteen years. No
other methods of service are authorized. (But see Annotations to Sections 85, 90). In Moss
v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475 (1908), the court said: "So we repeat that, whatever
may be the holdings elsewhere, our court places the acquisition ofjurisdiction upon which a
personal judgment can be rendered upon the fact of personal service of the party with process
in this State." On th- other hand, if an individual is personally served with process in this
State, a personal judgment may be rendered against him although he is a non-resident
and only temporarily here at the time of the service. Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 21
S. W. 29 (1893); Bledsoe v. Letson, 215 S. W. 513 (Mo. App. 1919); State ex rel. Weasr v.
Moore, 164 Mo. App. 649, 147 S. W. 551 (1912). In Severson v. Dickinson, 216 Mo. App.
572, 259 S. W. 518 (1924), a judgment rendered in Wisconsin against a non-resident of that
State was enforced when suit was brought upon it in Missouri. Service in the original suit
was made upon the defendant while he was in Wisconsin.
Missouri Statutes (R. S. Mo., 1929) Relating to
Service of Process in Actions Against Individuals.
Sec. 728 provides for service upon an individual in suits instituted in a Court of Record.
As to service of summons issued by a Justice of the Peace, see Sec. 2196.
Sec. 739 provides for service by publication in certain actions in rem and quasi in rem.
See also, Sec. 740. Sec. 748 provides for personal service beyond the limits of the state, in
any of the cases mentioned in Sec. 739. Service by publication, or personal service beyond
the limits of the state, will not support a personal judgment. Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon,
281 Mo. 72, 218 S. W. 873 (1920); Shemwell v. Bettis, 264 Mo. 268, 174 S. W. 390 (1915);
State ex rel. McIndoe v. Blair, 238 Mo. 132, 142 S. W. 326 (1911); Wilson v. St. Louis S. F.
Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286 (1891); Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575 (1873); Elvins v
Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159 S. W. 746 (1913). Sec. 748 has been held to be unconstitutional, if construed to mean that a personal judgment can be rendered upon service outside
the state. Jones v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn., 188 S. W. 82 (1916); Givens v. Harlow,
251 Mo. 231, 158 S. W. 355 (1913); Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475 (1908). The
last mentioned case is discussed under Section 85.
Sec. 1296 provides for service of process in attachment suits in Courts of Record. See
also, Secs. 739, 748, supra,providing for service by publication and service outside the State.
As to when a personal judgment may be rendered in such suits, see Secs. 1309, 1313. As to
attachment suits in Juatice Courts, see Chap. 1I, Art. 1. Service by publication, or personal
service outside the state, will not support a personal judgment in an attachment suit.
Givens v. Harlow, 251 Mo. 231, 158 S. W. 355 (1913); State ex rel. McIndoe v. Blair, 238
Mo. 132, 142 S. W. 326 (1911); Bryant v. Duffy, 128 Mo. 18, 30 S. W. 317 (1895); Cabell v.
Grubbs, 48 Mo. 353 (1871); Johnson v. Holley, 27 Mo. 594 (1859); Payne v. Brooke,
217 S. W. 595, (Mo. App. 1920); Maurerv. Phillips, 182 Mo. App. 440, 168 S. W. 669 (1914).
As to service of process in suits for the recovery of alimony or maintenance, see Sec.
1351. Service by publication, or personal service outside the state, will not support a personal
judgment for alimony or maintenance. Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575 (1873); Elvins v.
Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159 S. W. 746 (1913); Hendrix v. Hendrix, 103 Mo. App. 40, 77
S. W. 495 (1903).
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Sec. 3164 relates to service of process in mechanic's lien suits in Courts of Record. As to
when a personal judgment may be rendered, see Sec. 3170. As to constructive service, see
Sees. 739, 748. As to service of process in such suits in Justice Courts, see Sees. 2540, 2542,
2543, 3090. See also, Sec. 2196. A personal judgment in a mechanic's lien suit, rendered upon
constructive service, is void. Bombeck v. Devorss, 19 Mo. App. 38 (1885); Schulenburg v.
Werner, 6 Mo. App. 292 (1878); R. S. 1929, Sec. 3169.
Sec. 3068 provides for the procedure in suits to foreclose mortgages and deeds of trust.
Sees. 3067, 3071 provide for the rendition of a personal judgment.
Sec. 1371 provides for the procedure in ejectment suits. Sees. 1377-1382 provide for the
recovery of damages and costs.
As to service of process in replevin suits in Courts of Record, see Sec. 1647. Sec. 2554
provides for service of summons in replevin suits in Justice Courts, and Sees. 2564, 2565
provide for the recovery of damages and costs in such suits.
As to service of process in suits in Justice Courts for the recovery of rent, see Sec. 2608.
See. 2452 provides for service of process in actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer by reading or delivering the summons and complaint to the defendant. This section
also provides that if the defendant is not found service may be had by posting notices in
certain public places or by publication in a newspaper. Sec. 2459 provides for the recovery
of damages for waste, rents, profits and costs.
No Missouri decision has been found
dealing with the question of whether a personal judgment for damages can be rendered in
such a suit where service is had by posting notices or by publication in a newspaper. In
view of the cases cited above which deal with service by publication and service outside the
state, it would seem that such methods of service will not support a personal judgment for
damages. See, State ex rel. Kelly v. Trimble, 297 Mo. 104, 247 S. W. 187 (1923); Gary Realty
Co. v. Swinney, 306 Mo. 592, 269 S. W. 961 (1924).
Comment c: Since the Missouri statutes do not provide for the other methods of service
mentioned in Comment c, such other methods are of importance in Missouri only where a
court here is asked to enforce a judgment of another state based upon such service. No
Missouri decisions have been found on this point. There is one exception to the statement
made above with reference to the methods of service authorized by the Missouri statutes,
but this exception requires special consideration. See the Missouri statutes cited under
Section 90.
Commentd: No Missouri decisions have been found involving this question. In all of the
Missouri cases where service was had by leaving the process at the defendant's "residence"
within the State, it seems that the defendant was domiciled within the State. See State ex
rel Fabrico v. Trimble, 309 Mo. 415, 274 S. W. 712 (1925); Wells v. Wells, 279 Mo. 57, 213
S. W. 830 (1919); and cases cited under Section 85.
Commente: The Missouri decisions dealing with this question are based upon a statute.
R. S. Mo., 1929, Sec. 720. Christianv. Williams, 111 Mo. 429, 20 S. W. 96 (1892), is authority
for the proposition that a resident defendant and witness attending court in a county in
Missouri other than that of his own residence is not privileged. The court said that the first
subdivision of Sec. 720 must prevail over the common law rule and based its decision upon
the words "was found". According to this interpretation of the statute the only requirement for getting servicc on a party is to find him in the county.
In Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 21 S. W. 29 (1893), a non-residentplaintiff who had
brought suit in Misgouri against another non-resident was served with process in a suit
brought by the person whom he had sued. The court held: (1) that the defendant was
subject to suit, and (2) that even if the defendant was immune from service, the privilege
had been waived. The court attempted to bring the case under the fourth subdivision of
Sec. 720 and relied upon Christian v. Williams, supra. Evidently realizing that the fourth
subdivision does not contain the words "was found", the court gave the additional reason
that a non-resident plaintiff comes into the state voluntarily to invoke the aid of the courts
for his own benefit, and therefore cannot object when the power of such courts is invoked
against him, citing Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858), a leading American case, holding that
such a person is not privileged.
State'ex rel. Weast v. Moore, 164 Mo. App. 649, 147 S. W. 551 (Springfield Ct. of App.
1912), holds that a non-resident while attending court as a defendant and witness in a cause
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in obedience to a summons in an action brought against him by a resident of the state is
subject to service of civil process in another action brought by the same party. The court
relied upon Baisley v. Baisley, supra, and apparently construed that decision to mean that
the effect of the statute is to abolish all privileges in that it makes no exceptions. The
Supreme Court has never passed upon the privilege of a non-resident defendant.
In Bledsoe v. Letson, 215 S. W. 513 (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1919), a non-resident of the
State was attending court in Missouri as a witness in a civil suit and while so doing was
served with summons in an action of deceit. Held, that the non-resident witness was not
privileged from service of civil process. The court made no attempt to justify its decision
and relied solely upon the three cases cited above. The Supreme Court has never directly
passed upon the privilege of a non-resident witness.
If Sec. 720 is strictly applied without regard for common law principles, the Supreme
Court will doubtless hold that non-resident defendants and non-resident witnesses are not
immune from service. For a criticism of the Missouri cases, see Note (1921) 21 U. of Mo.
Bull. Law Ser. 27; Hale v. Whdirton, 73 Fed. 739 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1896). In Hale v. Wharton,
the Federal court sitting in Missouri refused to follow the Missouri cases cited above. See
also StewArt v. Ramsey, 242 U. S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Note (1925) 20 Ill.
L. Rev. 172. But the Missouri cases are not inconsistent with the Restatement. See paragraph two of Comment e.
Several Missouri decisions recognize the rule that a party lured into the jurisdiction
by fraud of the plaintiff is immune from service of civil process. In Vastine, 4dm. v. Bast,
41 Mo. 493 (1867), the plaintiff filed a bill in equity to set aside ajudgment rendered against
him as garnishee on the ground that he was not a resident of Missouri, and that by fraudulent
misrepresentations he had been induced to come within the state so that process might be
served upon him as garnishee. While the court refused to set aside the judgment, it said:
"No court should sanction any attempt to bring a party within its jurisdiction by fraud and
misrepresentations. If the plaintiff was prevailed upon to come within the state by false
statements or fraudulent pretenses, for the purpose of serving him with process, he should
have appeared at the return term and made application to have the service set aside. But
he cannot now be relieved against his own gross negligence in disregarding the service."
Holker u. Hennessey, 141 Mo. 527, 536, 42 S. W. 1090 (1897) and Christianv. Williams, 111
Mo. 429, 443, 20 S. W. 96 (1892) contain dicta to the same effect.
The cases dealing with abuse of criminal process are cited under Section 84.

Section 84.

Individual Involuntarily Within the State.

A state cannot exercise jurisdiction through "tscourts over an invidicual
brought into the state by force against his will, wrongfully or by act of God,
until he has had a reasonable opportunity to leave the state.
Comments:

a. The case of fraud, considered in Section 83, Comment e, differs from
that of force, in that one who is by fraud induced to come into a state nevertheless wills to come in; while one who is constrained by force is in no sense
acting voluntarily.
Illustrations:
1. A is kidnapped by B in state X and brought into state Y.
While he is forcibly held in Y, C brings action against him there. The
action will be dismissed.
2. A in state X is induced by the fraud of B to come into state Y.
While still in Y, not having discovered the fraud, A is sued there by C.
The action will lie.
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3.

A is on a sea voyage from state X to state Y. By stress of weather

the vessel is driven off the course and wrecked on the coast of state Z.
A is saved. B brings action against A in Z, before A has an opportunity
to leave Z. The action wi!l be dismissed.
b. When an individual is brought into a state by extradition, under
arrest, or by other legal process, the state will not exercise jurisdiction over
him through its courts, except in the action in which the process was issued,
until he has been freed from arrest and has had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the state. This general rule may be modified by a constitutional provision, as in the case of interstate rendition under the Constitution of the
United States.
c. In the case considered in Section 63 of a man brought back into the
state after a temporary absence while under arrest, the jurisdiction relied

upon is that which attached at the first moment of arrest while the individual
was in the state.
Annotation:

No Missouri decisions have been found where an individual was brought into the state
by force against his will, wrongfully or by act of God. A few cases deal with the abuse of
criminal process. In Byler v. Jones, 79 Mo. 261 (1883), it was contended that under a statute
(R. S. 1929, Sec. 720), process in a civil action was properly served upon a resident of another
county "found" in the county where he was served, although he was present in such county
by virtue of criminal process, regardless of the motives which caused the institution of the
criminal proceeding. The court held that the criminal process of the state cannot be used to
take a person from one county to another so as to subject him to civil process in the latter
county. Accord: Bowman v. Neblett, 24 S. W. (2d) 697 (Springfield Ct. of App. 1930).
But where a resident has been arrested under criminal process and brought into a county
other than that of his residence, he is not immune from service of civil process, where such
criminal proceeding was not for the purpose of bringing him within the county so that civil
process might be served upon him. Morris v. Dowell, 205 S. W. 229 (St. Louis Ct. of App.
1918). Cf. Ex parte Noell, 220 Mo. App. 702, 293 S. W. 488 (1927), 293 S. W. 491 (1927).
In all of the cases cited above, the defendant was a resident of the state, and the cases
do not deal with state jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws sense. For a discussion of the
immunity of non-resident defendants in criminal cases from service of civil process, see Note
(1925) 20 il. Law Rev. 172; 14 A. L. R. 771, where cases from other jurisdictions are collected.

Section 85.

Individual Domiciled Within the State.

A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual
domiciled within the state, although he is not present within the state.
Comments:
a. A state has jurisdiction over a person domiciled in the state and can
exercise jurisdiction over him through its courts by rendering a judgment imposing a personal liability upon him. Such a judgment is valid in the state
in which it is rendered and will be recognized by other states as valid.
Illustrations:
1. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
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in X but is in state Y. In accordance with a statute, process is served upon
B by handing a summons to B in Y. The court has jurisdiction over B.
2. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in X, but is in state Y. In accordance with a statute, process is served
upon B by delivering a summons at his "usual place of abode" in X to an
adult member of his family. The court has jurisdiction over B.
3. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in X but is in state Y. In accordance with a statute, process is served
upon B by mailing a summons to B at his address in Y. The court has
jurisdiction over B.
b. A method of service of process upon a person domiciled within the
state is valid, if, but only if, it is one reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard (Section 80).
Illustrations.
4. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in X, but has gone abroad with his family. Process is served upon B
by thrusting a summons under the door of his usual place of abode in X,
which is vacant during B's absence. This is not a reasonable method of
notification, and the court has no jurisdiction over B.
5. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled
in X but has left the state intending to make his home in another state if he
can find a suitable dwelling-house. B still has a dwelling-house in X in
which his wife is living. In accordance with a statute, process is served
upon B by publication in a newspaper. B fails to appear. This is not
a reasonable method of notification, and the court has no jurisdiction
over B.
Annotation:
Comment a, Illusiraion1: In Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475 (1908), plaintiff
brought an action for divorce in Missouri against her husband who was at the time in
Wyoming. He was personally served with process in Wyoming, but not in Missouri, and
he did not enter his appearance. Held, that the court had no jurisdiction to award plaintiff
a general judgment for alimony. It would seem that the actual decision in this case is not
inconsistent with Section 85 and the case stated in Illustration I because (1) it is not clear
whether the defendant was a resident or a non-resident of Missouri; and (2) the court apparently held that service outside the state was not authorized by the statute. As to the
first point, the court said: "In other words, no process issued by the courts of this state
and served upon the party defendant in another state can be the basis of a personal judgment. And this is true whether the party in fact is a citizen of this state or of another state. To
be more explicit, when our process crosses the state line it looses its vitality as an instrument
upon which a personal judgment can be entered." (p. 501. Italics the writer's). If the defendant was a non-resident, the statement concerning a resident is dictum. As to the second
point, the statute (R. S. 1899, Sec. 582; R. S. 1929, Sec. 748) expressly provides that in certain actions, including divorce actions, service outside the state "shall be as effectual
within the limits of this state as personal service within the state." But the Supreme Court
said that "the Legislature has no intention of giving the service in section 582 a broader
scope than that of publication," (R. S. 1899, Sec. 575, R. S. 1929, Se.. 739), and that service
by either method only gives the court jurisdiction over the res in actions in rem (pp. 497
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498). If this decision merely holds that service outside the state is not authorized by the
statute, in actions in personam, it is consistent with Section 85, Illustration I. Because a
state can exercise jurisdiction over an individual domiciled within the state, by serving him
personally outside the state, it does not follow that in a particular state, that method of
service is authorized by law. It would follow that the case mentioned in Illustration I
is of importance in Missouri only where a court here is asked to enforce a judgment of
another state based upon such service. No Missouri decision has been found on this point.
In Daniels v. A. T. & S. Fe R. Co., 58 Mo. App. 202 (1904), it does not appear whether the
defendant was a resident or a non-resident.
Although Moss v. Fitch, SuPitA, can be distinguished from the case stated in Illustration1,
the language of the court indicates that if the Legislature had intended to authorize such
service, the court would have held the statute unconstitutional, even in the case of a defendant domiciled within the state. See page 501 of the opinion. Other cases express the
view that a state cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual who is not served
within the state. Palmer v. Bank, 281 Mo. 72, 218 S. W. 873 (1920) (defendants were nonresidents and service by publication); Jones v. 4nheuser Busch Brewing Ass'n., 188 S. W.
82 (Mo. 1916) (defendants non-residents and service outside state); Priest v. Capitan, 236
Mo. 446, 457, 139 S. W. 204 (1920) (like last case); Wilson v. St. Louis S. F. R. Co., 108 Mo.
588, 18 S. W. 286 (1891) (like last case); Ellis v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575, 578 (1873) (defendants
non-residents and service by publication); Latimer v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 43 Mo. 105, 109
(1868) (defendant a foreign corporation not doing business in state); Smith V. McCutchen,
38 Mo. 416, 417 (1866) (defendant a non-resident and service by publication); Hendrix v.
Hendrix, 103 Mo. App. 40, 77 S. W. 495 (1903) (defendant a non-resident and service outside state). See also McMenamy Inv. & Real Estate Co. v. Stillwell Catering Co., 175 Mo.
App. 668, 158 S. W: 427 (1913), 267 Mo. 340, 184 S. W. 467 (1915), cited and discussed
under Section 93. In all of these cases, it will be noted, the defendant was a non-resident and
in some of them the service was by publication. As to service by publication, see Comment
b of this section.
It is clear that a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-consenting
absentee, regardless of the method of notification employed, for the reason that such a
defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the state. (Restatement, Section 79). It
would seem that the cases cited above, including Moss v. Fitch, fail to distinguish between
(1) the question whether the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the state (Restatement, Section 79), and (2) the question of reasonable notice (Restatement, Section 80).
The Restatement takes the position that a person domiciled within a state is subject to the
jurisdiction of the state, and that personal service outside the state is reasonable notice.
See Becker v. Becker, 218 S. W. 542 (Tex. 1920); Burdick, Service as a Requirement of Due
Process in Actions in Personam, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 422, 430-431. If Moss V. Fitch stands for
the proposition that a state cannot acquire jurisdiction over a person domiciled within the
state, but not present there, or that personal service outside the state is not a reasonable
method of notification, it is inconsistent with the Restatement and the Missouri decisions
cited in the following paragraph.
Illustration 2: Although the Missouri courts have insisted that a state cannot render a
personal judgment against an individual unless he is personally served with process within
the state or enters an appearance, the decisions are in accord with the case stated in Illustration 2. Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo. 567, 229 S. W. 1064 (1921); Hamill v. Talbott,
72 Mo. App. 22 (1897); s. c. 81 Mo. App. 210 (1899); Corby v. Wright, 4 Mo. App. 443 (1877).
Wagoner v. Wagoner is directly in point. In Hammill v. Talbott, the actual decisions were
placed on other grounds but in both opinions the court agreed with the view stated in
Illustration 2. In this case the court intimated that service outside the state would be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a person domiciled within the state, and this language
was criticized in Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 501, 111 S. W. 475 (1908). But it is submitted
that Moss v. Fitch did not overrule Hamill v. Talbort as to the question raised in Illustration
2. In Corby v. Wright, the court cited with approval the case of Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429
(1861), which is the very case cited in Illustration2.
Several other decisions sustain the conclusion reached in Illustration 2, one of which was
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decided after Moss v. Fitch. Venuci v. Cademartori, 59 Mo. 352 (1875), was an action on a
note. Defense, statute of limitation. Defendant went to Italy in 1861 and remained until
1872. He left his family at his "residence" in Missouri, where they remained during the
whole time, and he provided for their support. Plaintiff contended that the statute did not
run in favor of the defendant during his absence. Held, that, as defendant had a "residence"
in Missouri, personal jurisdiction could have been acquired by leaving a copy of the summons with a member of the defendant's family in Missouri, and therefore the statute ran
in his favor. Accord: Davis v. Carp, 258 Mo. 686, 167 S. W. 1042 (1914); Garth v. Robards,
20 Mo. 523 (1855); Independent Breweries Co. v. Lavin; 207 S. W. 851 (Mo. App. 1919);
Bensley v. Haeberle,20 Mo. App. 648 (1886). Cf. Miller v. Tyler, 61 Mo. 401 (1875); Johnson
v. Smith, 43 Mo. 499 (1869). In these cases the basis of jurisdiction mentioned by the court
was the defendant's "residence" within the state, but it seems that by residence the court
meant domicile.
These cases concede that a person domiciled within the state is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, although he is not present therein. If a state can acquire jurisdiction
over such a person by leaving the process at his usual place of abode within the state, in
which event he may never receive the summons, it is difficult to see why personal service
outside the state is not sufficient.
Illustration 3: No provision has been made by statute in Missouri for service by mail
upon a person domiciled within the state. This case becomes important only in the determination of the effect to be given the judgment of another state, based upon such an exercise of
jurisdiction.
Comment b: The law of Missouri is in accord with the general proposition stated in
this comment. There can be no doubt in this country that the requirement of reasonable
notice is made obligatory by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Section 80. No provision
seems to have been made by statute in Missouri for the methods of service mentioned in
Illustrations I and 5. The Missouri decisions hold that under the local statutes, service
by publication will not support a personal judgment. See Missouri statutes and decisions
cited under Section 83. In most of these cases no point was made as to whether the defendant
was domiciled in Missouri or not, but the cases indicate that even if a statute authorizes
service by publication such service is not alone a sufficient method of notification under any
circumstances as a basis for the rendition of a personal judgment against an individual.
Since the Missouri statutes do not authorize the methods of service mentioned in Illustrations 4 and 5, these methods are of importance in Missouri only where a court here is asked
to enforce a judgment of another state based upon such an exercise of jurisdiction.

Section 86.

National of the State.

A state which in the law of nations has standing as a nation can exercise
through its courts jurisdiction over its nationals, although they are not present
or domiciled within the state.
Comments:

a. A state which in the law of nations has no standing as a nation because it is a member of a federated nation (see Section 49, Comment b) has
no jurisdiction to render a judgment binding its nationals who are not present
or domiciled within the state and who have not consented or subjected them-

selves to the exercise of jurisdiction.
A State of the United States cannot exercise jurisdiction upon this ground,
over a person not domiciled in the State, though he is a citizen of the United

States, because a State of the United States has not in the law of nations
standing as a nation.
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The Congress of the United States has not ordinarily authorized the
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over absent citizens of the United States
not domiciled in the United States.
b. Problems relating to nationality as a basis of jurisdiction arise in this
country only when ajudgment has been rendered by a court of a foreign nation
against its nationals and an attempt is made to enforce in this country rights
created by the judgment. Under the principle stated in this Section such
judgment is recognized as valid; but whether or not the judgment will be
enforced by the courts of a State of the United States depends upon the law
of the particular State as to the enforcement of foreign judgments (see Section
00). As to the distinction between recognition and enforcement of rights,
see Section 43, Comment d.
c. A method of service of process upon a national is not valid unless it is
one reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard (Section 80).
Annotation:

This point could only arise upon the question of the effect of a foreign judgment based
upon such an exercise of jurisdiction. No Missouri decisions have been found in which this
question was presented.

Section 87.

Jurisdiction by Consent.

A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual
who consents to such exercise of jurisdiction.
Comments:
a. The consent here considered as a basis of jurisdiction is actual assent
to the exercise ofjurisdiction. It may be expressed in words or shown by conduct.
b. Consent may be given with respect to a particular action either
after the action has been brought or before the action has been brought;
or it may be given generally with respect to actions which may thereafter be
brought.
Illustrations:
1. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B author'zes
C, his attorney, to confess judgment against him in the action. C confesses
judgment against B. The court has jurisdiction over B.
2. A makes a contract with B. In the contract it is agreed, that in an
action brought to enforce a liability arising out of the contract, service
of process may be made by mailing a summons to a designated address.
A brings an action for breach of contract against B in a court of state X
and the summons is mailed to B at the designated address. The court
has jurisdiction over B.
3. B executes a note payable to A. The note contains a warrant
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of attorney signed by B, authorizing any attorney to enter an appearance
for B in an action upon the note and to confess judgment against B. A
brings an action upon the note in a court of state X, and C, an attorney,
enters an appearance for B and confesses judgment against B. The
court has jurisdiction over B.
4. B is a shareholder in a corporation of state X. By the articles of
association it is provided that an action may be brought in state X against
shareholders to enforce against them individual liability on obligations
of the corporation, service being made upon the shareholders by mail.
A, a creditor of the corporation, brings an action in a court of X against B
to enforce such a liability, and process is served upon B by mail. The court
has jurisdiction over B.
5. B appoints an agent in state X and authorizes him to receive
service of process in any action brought against B in a court of X. A
brings an action against B in a court of X and process is served upon the
agent. The court has jurisdiction over B.
c. An acceptance or waiver of service of process in an action, though
given by a defendant outside a state, confers jurisdiction over the defendant,
when it expresses a consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of the
state. Whether an acceptance or waiver of service is a consent to the exercise
of jurisdiction depends upon the fair interpretaion of the language and conduct
of the defendant.
Illustration:
6. A brings an action against B in a court of state X. A copy
of the summons is handed to B in state Y. B executes an instrument
stating that he accepts service of process, waives personal service and
agrees that the action may proceed against him as though he had been
personally served. The court has jurisdiction over B.
d. When a person has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court over him upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, the court has jurisdiction over him as a result of his consent if, but only if, the conditions are
fulfilled.
Illustration:
7. B executes a note in state Y payable to A. The note contains a
warrant of attorney signed by B authorizing any attorney of any court
of record to enter an appearance for B in an action upon the note and to
confess judgment against B. A brings an action upon the note in a court
of state X and C who is not an attorney but a prothonotary of a court of
X enters an appearance for B and confesses judgment against B. By
the law of X a prothonotary is authorized to confess judgment upon a
warranty of attorney, with the same effect as though he were an attorney.
The court in which the action is brought has not jurisdiction over B.
e. Consent given by a person to the exercise by a court of jurisdiction
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over him was irrevocable, if there was a valid contract, express or implied,
not to revoke it. If it was a gratuitous consent it may be revoked at any time
before action is brought. If action is brought while the consent, even though
gratuitous, was not revoked, jurisdiction attaches, and subsequent revocation
of consent cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court (see Section 92).
f. While consent of parties may give jurisdiction to a court which has
been authorized by the state to hear a cause, no consent of parties can enlarge
the competence of a particular court which has not been authorized by the
state to act.
Illustration:
8. A local court is by statute confined to claims not exceeding $1000.
A sues B in such a court on an alleged agreement to pay $2000. B enters
a general appearance and denies the obligation, and the court gives
judgment for $2000. The judgment is invalid.
g. The principle stated in this Section is applicable only when jurisdic-

tion over the person alone is sought. When jurisdiction over a thing or over
a status is sought, as in an action for the recovery of land or for a divorce,
other principles are applicable (see Sections 104, 116 to 126).
Annotation:
Comment b, Illustration 1: The Missouri statutes provide for judgment by confession.
R. S. Mo. 1929, Sees. 1093-1096. See First National Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S. W.
36 (1909).
Comment b, Illustration2: No Missouri cases have been found on this point.
Comment b, Illustration 3: It is held that such a judgment entered in another state on
confession of an attorney, which is valid under the law of that state, will be enforced in
Missouri when made the basis of a suit in this state. Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 544, 63 S. W.
489 (1901); Randolph v. Keiler, 21 Mo. 557 (1855); Headlee v. Cain, 250 S. W. 611 (Mo. App.
1923); Jarrettv. Sippely, 175 Mo. App. 197, 157 S. W. 975 (1913); Vennum v. Merten, 119
Mo. App. 461, 95 S. W. 292 (1906). But a warrant of attorney written into a promissory
note authorizing confession of judgment is void as against public policy and will not be
enforced in an action originally instituted in Missouri. First Nat'l Bank U.White, 220 Mo.
717, 120 S. W. 36 (1909). This case is not in disagreement with the Restatement, but the
State of Missouri has not exercised the power which it could exercise if it chose to do so.
Comment b, Illustration 4: No Missouri cases have been found on this point.
Comment b, Illustration5: The statutes provide that non. resident applicants for permits
to operate motor carriers within the state, including individuals, must appoint some person
or the Secretary of State an agent for the applicant on whom service of process may be had.
(R. S. 1929, Sees. 5271-72). The Blue Sky Law contains a similar provision. (R. S. 1929,
See. 7735). The foreign corporation cases are cited under Section 97.
Comment c: See R. S. 1929, Sec. 730.
Comment d: The Missouri decisions are in accord with this comment. Bonnet-Brown
Sales Service v. Utt, 19 S. W. (2d) 888 (Mo. 1929); First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717,
1. c. 727, 120 S. W. 36 (1909); Hester v. Frink, 189 Mo. App. 40, 176 S. W. 481 (1915);
Central Penn. Conference, etc., v. LaRue, 164 Mo. App. 93, 148 S. W. 152 (1912).
Comment e: In Hester v. Frink, 189 Mo. App. 40, 176 S. W. 481 (1915), the court found
the authority to confess judgment, which constituted the consent, had been revoked by
payment of the note.
Comment]: The law of Missouri is in accord with this comment. State ex rel Allen v.
Trimble, 317 Mo. 751, 297 S. W. 378 (1927); Meierhoffer v. Hansel,294 Mo. 195, 243 S. W.
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131 (1922); Smith v. Simpson, 80 Mo. 634 (1883); Webb v. Tweedie, 30 Mo. 488 (1860);
State ex rel. Rakowsky v. Bates, 286 S. W. 420 (Mo. 1926); State ex rel. Wholey v. Porterfield,
221 Mo. App. 666, 283 S. W. 459 (1926); White v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 72 Mo. App. 400
(1897) (a corporation case). Parties cannot confer jurisdiction on an appellate court by
consent. State ex rel. Kersey v. Sims, 309 Mo. 18, 274 S. W. 359 (1925); Bothev. C. B. & Q.
Ry. Co., 248 Mo. 36, 154 S. W. 98 (1913) (a corporation case).

Section 88. Appearance.
An appearance by a defendant in an action gives the court jurisdiction
over him for all purposes of the action if by the law of the state in which the
action is brought the appearance has that effect.
Comments:
a. It is a question of the law of the state in which the action is brought
whether an appearance entered by a defendant in an action is of such character
as to subject him to the jurisdiction of the court.
An appearance entered by a defendant solely for the purpose of objecting
that the court has no jurisdiction over him, is held, in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, not to subject him to the jurisdiction of the court.
An appearance entered by a defendant for a purpose other than to object
that the court has no jurisdiction over him, is usually held to subject him to
the jurisdiction of the court.
An appearance in an action brought in a court of a State for the purpose
of presenting to the State court a petition for removal of the action to a federal
court does not give jurisdiction over him either to the State court or to the
federal court.
b. If by the law of the state in which an action is brought an appearance
by a defendant solely for the purpose of objecting that the court has no jurisdiction over him gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant, such an appearance subjects a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, so that the
judgment rendered against him after such appearance will be recognized in other
states as valid. His appearance in the action entails the consequence of subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the court although he does not intend and expressly states that he does not intend his appearance to have that consequence.
The rendition of such a judgment by a court of a State is not a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
c. If such be the law of the state in which an action is brought, an appearance by a defendant in an action subjects him to the jurisdiction of the
court not only as to claims stated in the original complaint, but also as to
other claims stated in amendments to the complaint, provided such claims
are made by the same plaintiff.
Illustration:
1. A brings an action against B in a court of state X alleging that
B beat A. B enters an appearance in the action. By the law of X, such
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an appearance subjects the defendant to all claims of the plaintiff which
may be added by amendment. Subsequently A amends his complaint
by addins a count in sh.nder. The court has jurisdiction to render a
judgment agaiist B for the slander.
d. In the absence of all the bases of jurisdiction mentioned :n Section
82, a state cannot eXLrcise jurisdiction over a defendant in an action on the
ground that an attorney at law not authorized to "ct for him, has entered an
appearance for him.
Annotation:
(Special Note: The cases cited below include cases as between parties subject to the
jurisdiction of the state, but not to the particular court, or where the service was defective,
and appearance waived the objections. Some of the cases deal with venue rather than
jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws sense. (See Restatement, Section 43). In Missouri,
however, questions of venue are often treated as questions of jurisdiction over the person.
Although these venue cases are not directly in point, it seems clear that in determining
what constitutes an appearance subjecting a defendant to the jurisdiction of the state,
the Missouri courts apply the same rules that are applied in determining whether the
defendant waived an objection to the venue. For this reason some of the venue cases are
cited below. The cases cited below also include the corporation cases, but the principles
governing the effect of an appearance by an individual are applicable to corporations.
(See Sections 93 and 94.) A detailed discussion of the methods of pleading lack of jurisdiction over the person and waiver by pleading over falls more to a treatise on pleading and
procedure than to one upon Conflict of Laws, but as these important.practical problems are
frequently raised in a case involving jurisdiction over the person, it seems desirable to consider them in connection with Section 88).
Comments a andb: Missouri follows the rule that an appearance entered by a defendant
solely for the purpose of objecting that the court has no jurisdiction over him does not subject him to the jurisdiction of the court. See Huff v. Shepard, 58 Mo. 242 (1874); State
ex rel. Rakowsky v. Bates, 286 S. W 420 (Mo. App. 1926); Evansville Grain Co. v. Mack/er,
88 Mo. App. 186 (1901). See cases cited in following paragraph.
A Missouri statute (R. S. 1929, Sec. 770) makes lack ofjurisdiction of either persons or
subject-matter ground for demurrer if the facts showing it appear on the face of the petition.
Since ordinarily jurisdiction of the person is not a matter to be alleged in the petition but
is obtained by service of process or consent of the defendant, it is unusual for lack ofjurisdiction over the person to appear on the face of the petition. But there are many Missouri
decisions in which it has been said that if such want ofjurisdiction does appear on the face of
the petition, the question must be raised by demurrer and not by answer. If the defendant
does file a demurrer on this ground and it is overruled, he waives the jurisdictional question
by pleading over and contesting the case on the merits. See Hendricks v. Calloway, 211 Mo.
536, 111 S. W. 60 (1908); Newcomb v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. Co., 182 Mo. 687, 707, 81 S. W.
1069 (1904) (defendant a foreign corporation); Harris v. McQuay, 300 S. W. 305, 307 (Mo.
App. 1927); Kingman-St. Louis Implemeni Co. v. Bantley Bros. Hdw. Co., 137 Mo. App.
308, 317, 118 S. W. 500 (1909) (defendant a domestic corporation). If the objection is to the
sufficiency of the return, it must be raised by motion to quash the return and not by answer.
See State ex rel. Pac. Mutual Lije Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (1912)
(defendant a foreign corporation). If the defendant does not file a motion to quash the
return but pleads to thejurisdiction of the court over his person in the same answer in which
he makes defense on the merits he waives the jurisdictional defect. Thomasson v. Mercantile
Town Mutual Ins. Co., 217 Mo. 485, 116 S. W. 1092 (1909) (domestic corporation case);
J'icecarver v. Mercantile Town Mutual Ins. Co., 137 Mo. App. 247, 117 S. W. 698 (1909)
(defendant a domestic corporation). See also State ex rel. Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (1912) (defendant a foreign corporation); Jackson v.

MISSOURI ANNOTATIONS

Weber Implement & Auto Co., 247 S. W. 468 (Mo. App. 1923) (defendant a domestic corporation); Buddecke v. Garrels, 203 Mo. App. 1, 216 S. W. 811 (1919). If the defendant does file
a motion to quash the return and it is overruled, he waives the jurisdictional question
by pleading over and contesting the case on the merits. He cannot preserve the point by
including it in his answer. Newcomb v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. Co., 182 Mo. 687, 81 S. W.
1069 (1904) (defendant a foreign corporation). See also Kionski v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 77
Mo. 362 (1883) (defendant domestic corporation). It would seem that if the objection is to
the substance of the notice or summons it should be raised by motion to quash the notice
or summons. See Curfman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 167 Mo. App. 507, 152 S. W.
126 (1912). When want of jurisdiction over the person does not appear on the face of the
petition or on the return, but a showing of new facts is necessary to establish it, the question
may be raised by answer. (R. S. 1929, Secs. 774, 776). In such cases the defendant may
plead to the jurisdiction of the court over his person in the same answer in which he makes
his defense on the merits; both defenses must be tried and neither is waived by the other.
See, Harris v. Mc9_uay, 300 S. W. 305 (Mo. App. 1928); Roberts v. American Nat'l Assurance
Co., 201 Mo. App. 239, 212 S. W. 390 (1919) (defendant a foreign corporation); Peak v.
International Harvester Co., 194 Mo. App. 128, 186 S. W. 574 (1916) (defendant a foreign
corporation); Barnett, Hayes & Barnett v. Colonial Hotel Bldg. Co., 137 Mo. App. 636, 119
S. W. 471 (1909) (defendant a domestic corporation); Kingman-St. Louis Implement Co. v.
Bantley Bros. Hdw. Co., 137 Mo. App. 308, 118 S. W. 500 (1909) (defendant a domestic
corporation); Jordan v. C. & A. R. Co., 105 Mo. App. 446, 79 S. W. 1155 (1904) (defendant
a foreign corporation). However, in Mertens v. McMahon, 28 S. W. (2d) 456 (Mo. App. 1930),
it was held that although the defendant had the right to join in his answer a plea to the
jurisdiction with one of the merits, when the question of jurisdiction arose out of matters
dehors the record, he waived the question of jurisdiction, by entering into a trial on the
merits after overruling of plea to jurisdiction contained in the answer. This case was certified to the Supreme Court.
For a full discussion of the methods of pleading lack of jurisdiction over the person and
waiver of jurisdiction by pleading over, see BOUR,SPECIAL APPEARANCE-WAIVER BY PLEADING OVER, (1929) 40 U. of Mo. Bull. Law Ser. 34, published before the decision in Mertens v.
McMahon, supra.
Missouri follows the general rule that an appearance by a defendant for a purpose
other than to object that the court has no jurisdiction over him subjects him to the jurisdiction of the court. See R. S. Mo., 1929, Sec. 724 and cases cited.
Pleading to the Merits: As stated above, when a showing of new facts is necessary to
establish lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendant may plead to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person in the same answer in which he makes his defense on the merits; both
defenses must be tried and neither is waived by the other. But see, Mertens a. McMahan,
supra. Except in this case, want of such jurisdiction is waived by answering to the merits.
Thomasson v. Mercntile Town Mutual Ins. Co., 217 Mo. 485, 116 S. W. 1092 (1909) (defendant a domestic corporation); Newcomb v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. Co., 182 Mo. 687, 81
S. W. 1069 (1904) (defendant a foreign corporation); Wicecarver v. Mercantile Town Mutual
Ins. Co., 137 Mo. App. 247, 117 S. W. 698 (1909) (defendant a domestic corporation);
McClure v. Paducah Iron Co., 90 Mo. App. 567 (1901) (defendant a foreign corporation).
By filing an answer and cross-bill. State ex rel. Angold v. Utz, 236 S. W. 386 (Mo. App. 1922).
And by appearing and contesting the case on the merits. Davidson v. Hough, 165 Mo.
561, 65 S. W. 731 (1901); Brown v. Woody, 64 Mo. 547 (1877); Cherry v. Wertheim, 25 S. W.
(2d) 118 (1930); Poe v. Western Buyers' Assn. Wholesale Grocers, 238 S. W. 547 (Mo. App.
1922) (defendant domestic corporation); Hayes v. Blaker, 138 Mo. App. 24, 119 S. W. 1004
(1909). It has been held that where a writ is returnable to no known terms of the law,
but to some day not the commencement of the terms, appearance and pleading will not cure
the defect. Holliday v. Cooper, 3 Mo. 286 (1834). See, Brown v. Marshall,241 Mo. 707, 145
S. W. 810 (1912) (service by publication); Williams v. Bower, 26 Mo. 601 (1858).
Objection to jurisdiction over subject-maiter: A motion to quash service of process and
return thereof and to dismiss action for lack of jurisdiction o- er the subject-matter constitutes a general appearance. State ex rel. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135,
143 S. W. 483 (1911) (defendant a foreign corporation).

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN

Demurrer: A demurrer, unless based solely on ground of lack ofjurisdiction, constitutes
a general appearance. Davis v. Fleming, 253 S. W. 798 (1923). See also Walsh v. Pulitzer
Pub. Co., 183 S. W. 587 (Mo. 1916) (corporation case).
Change of Venue: An application for change of venue waives lack ofjurisdiction over
the person. Feedler v. Schroeder, 59 Mo. 364 (1875); Sunderland v. Hackney Mfg. Co., 192
Mo. App. 287, 181 S. W. 1192 (1915) (defendant a foreign corporation). Baisley v. Baisley,
113 Mo. 544, 21 S. W. 29 (1893), involved immunity from service rather than want ofjurisdiction, for the defendant was served within the state, but the court said that when the
defendant applied for a change of venue he "waived proper service of process and admitted
the jurisdiction of the court over his person." See also Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209
Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1908).
Continuance and Stipulations: A party makes a general appearance by consenting
to a continuance. Eldon Ice & Fuel Co. v. Van Hooser, 163 Mo. App. 591, 147 S. W. 161
(1912); Seay v. Sanders, 88 Mo. App. 478 (1901). See also Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544,
21 S. W. 29 (1892), (involving immunity from service rather than lack of jurisdiction);
Peters v. St. Louis & Iron Mt. Ry. Co., 59 Mo. 406 (1875) (corporation case); Farrell's
Adm'r v. Brennan's Adm'rx, 25 Mo. 88 (1857) (will contest); Columbia Brewery Co. v.
Forgey, 140 Mo. App. 605, 120 S. W. 625 (1909) (a venue case).
A stipulation or agreement with respect to the time and place of trial also constitutes a
general appearance. Markey v. Louisiana etc. Ry. Co., 185 Mo. 348, 84 S. W. 61 (1904)
(defendant a domestic corporation); State ex rel Tiche v. Brown, 23 S. W. (2d) 1092 (Mo.
App. 1930). Also an appearance for purpose of having case put at foot of docket. Orear v.
Clough, 52 Mo. 55 (1873).
Taking Depositions: A general appearance is made by taking depositions to be used in
the trial of the cause on the merits. Morick v. Morick, 196 S. W. 1029 (Mo. App. 1917)
(by taking depositions and contesting motion to award alimony pendente lite). See Bankers'
Life Ass'n v. Shelton, 84 Mo. App. 634 (1900). Cf. Roberts v. American Nat. Assur. Co.,
201 Mo. App. 239, 212 S. W. 390 (1919) (a corporation case involving a question of venue).
And by appearing to participate in taking depositions. See Silvey v. Silvey, 192 Mo. App.
179, 180 S. W. 1071 (1915) (appearing without objections to participate in taking depositions
and paying judgment of alimony pendente lite). The mere presence of defendant at time
and place of taking depositions, without participating therein, will not amount to waiver
of service of process. Anderson v. Anderson, 55 Mo. App. 268 (1893).
In State ex rel. Compagnie Generale Translantique v. Falkenhainer, 309 Mo. 224, 274
S. W. 758 (1925), a suit for personal in'uries received outside Missouri, it was held that the
conduct of defendant's counsel in consenting and appearing in taking depositions outside
the state at a place different from that mentioned in the notice without ob'ection to jurisdiction of Missouri courts, and stipulating for the submission of objection to materiality
and relevancy of question for determination of the Missouri court, constitutes a submission
to jurisdiction of Missouri court by the defendant, a foreign corporation. The depositions
included matter going to the merits of the case. Cf. State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 193
Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916, 57 A. L. R. 1218 (1927).
Attack upon attachment or garnishment: As to effect of attack by defendant upon
attachment or garnishment as an appearance subjecting him personally to jurisdiction, see
Whiting v. Budd, 5 Mo. 443 (1838); Evans v. King, 7 Mo. 411 (1842); Withers v. Rodgers,
24 Mo. 340 (1857). For cases in other jurisdictions, see 55 A. L. R. 1121.
Appealfrom a justice court: An appeal from a justice court to a higher court, where
there is a trial de novo, constitutes such an appearance as to waive defects in or absence
of summons or service. Peter Hauptman Tobacco Co. v. Unverferth, 288 Mo. 52, 231 S. W.
628 (1921); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co., 287 Mo. 452,230 S. W. 82 (1921)
(defendant a foreign corporation). See also Lesan Aldverlising Co. v. Castleman, 265 Mo.
345, 177 S. W. 597 (1915).
For cases in other jurisdictions, see 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661.
Motion to vacate a :udlmen;: As to the effect of a motion to set aside a judgment on the
ground that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, see Higgins v. Beckwith, 102 Mo. 456, 14 S. W. 931 (1890) (a suit to quiet title); Cloud D.Inhabitantsof Town of
Pierce Ciy, 86 Mo. 357 (1885); Smith's Adm. v. Rollins, 25 Mo. 408 (1857). See also Pomeroy
v. Betts & Mellen, 31 Mo. 419 (1862) (in rem). Cf Boulware v. C. & 4. R. R. Co., 79 Mo
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494 (1883) (a corporation case); Gant v. C. R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Mo. 502 (1883) (a
corporate defendant); Fitterling v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 79 Mo. 504 (1883) (corporate defendant). In the last three cases cited, the defendant also appealed from justice court to
circuit court. As to the effect of a motion to set aside a judgment for want of jurisdiction
over the defendant, which motion also strikes at the merits, see Meyer v. Ruby-Trust Min.
& Mill. Co., 192 Mo. 162, 90 S. W. 821 (1905) (a garnishment proceeding) (defendant a
foreign corporation); Case v. Smith, 215 Mo. App. 621, 257 S. W. 148 (1923); CurreV v.
Trinity Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co., 157 Mo. App. 423, 139 S W. 212 (1911) (defendant a
foreign corporation). See also Pry v. The Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co., 73 Mo. 123
(1881) (a corporation case).
Petitionfor rmoval tofederal court: The law of Missouri is in accord with the Restatement (Comment a). Electrolytic Chroline Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 41 S. W. (2d) 1049
(Mo. 1931).
Comment c: In Missouri a petition cannot be amended so as to state an entirely different
cause of action from the one declared on in the original petition. It would seem, therefore,
that the question presented in this comment cannot arise in Missouri unless a court here is
asked to enforce a judgment of another state based upon facts stated in Illustration 1.
(See Section 81, Comment a).
Comment d: It is held in Missouri that a domestic judgment cannot be assailed collaterally on the ground that it was rendered upon an unauthorized appearance of an attorney. Johnson v. Baumhoff, 18 S. W. (2d) 13 (Mo. 1929) (a partition suit); Scott v. Royston,
223 Mo. 568, 123 S. W. 454 (1909) (action to sell land for payment of debts); Cochran v.
Thomas, 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W. 6 (1895) (a partition suit). See State ex tel. etc., v. Falkenhainer,309 Mo. 224, 274 S. W. 758 (1925) (a foreign corporation case). But the weight of
authority is contra. See cases cited in Scott v. Royston, supra, where the court said (p. 594):
"My individual opinion is that the reason and weight of authority is to the contrary, as is
shown by the following cases." The Missouri decisions hold, however, that if an action is
brought in Missouri upon a judgment of a sister state, the defendant may show that the
appearance of the attorney in the original suit was unauthorized, and the recitals in the
record of any such judgment, on the subject of jurisdiction, may be contradicted by extraneous evidence. Stuart v. Dickinson, 290 Mo. 516, 235 S. W. 446 (1921) and cases cited.
In such a case it would seem that there is but one ground upon which a Missouri court
would be justified in refusing to enforce the judgment of the sister state, namely, that the
court of the sister state had no jurisdiction over the defendant. It would seem to follow that
the judgment would be void even in the state where rendered. The situation here is somewhat analogous to that in Section 82, Comment a.
It has been held in Missouri that on a motion to vacate a domestic judgment a party
may show he was never served and that the attorney who appeared for him was not authorized to do so. Bradley v. Welch, 100 Mo. 258, 12 S. W. 911 (1890); Craig v. Smith, 65 Mo.
536 (1877). See Markey v. La. & Mo. River Ry. Co., 185 Mo. 348, 84 S. W. 61 (1904) (defendant a foreign corporation); Patterson v. Yancey, 97 Mo. App. 681, 71 S. W. 845 (1903).
Cf. Cooper v. Armour & Co., 15 S. W. (2d) 946, (Mo. App. 1929). And a garnishee may show
that the judgment is void because the attorney who appeared for the garnishee's creditor
(the defendant) was not authorized to do so. McPike Drug Co. v. Wilson, 237 S. W. 1044
(Mo. App. 1922).

Section 89.

Jurisdiction over Plaintiff.

A plaintiff by bringing an action in a state subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the state as to the claim sued upon, and, if the law of the state so
provides at the time the plaintiff brings his action, as to any set-off, counterclaim or cross-action brought against him by the defendant.
Comment:
a.

A plaintiff by bringing an action subjects himself to the jurisdiction
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of the state and of the court in which the action is brought as to the claim
sued upon.
Illustrations:
1. A brings an action for battery against B in a court of state X.
B appears, and a judgment is given A for one thousand dollars. Later A
brings an action in a court of state Y against B, based upon the original
cause of action. The judgment rendered by the court of X is a defense.
2. A brings an action against B for battery in a court of state X.
B appears and judgment is given for B. Later A brings in a court of state
Y an action against B based upon the original cause of action. The
judgment rendered by the court of X is a defense.
b. A plaintiff by bringing an action subjects himself to the jurisdiction
of the state and of the court in which the action is brought as to all set-offs
or counterclaims which the defendant in accordance with the law of the state
files in the action.
Illustration:
3. A brings an action in state X against B upon a promissory note
for one thousand dollars. B sets up by way of counterclaim a note for
two thousand dollars made by A payable to B. A judgment is rendered
in B's favor for one thousand dollars. The court has jurisdiction to render
this judgment.
c. A state may provide that a non-resident who brings an action in
a court of the state shall be held to answer to any action brought against him
by the defendant. Ajudgmenc rendered against such a non-resident in such a
cross-action is valid whether rendered by the same court in which he brought
the original action or by another court of the same state, and although he was
not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
The rendition of such a judgment by a court of a State is not a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Illustration:
4. By a statute of state X it is provided that if a non-resident
brings an action in a court of the state, and the defendant in the action
has a cause of action against the plaintiff, the defendant may in an action
upon that cause of action serve process upon the attorney of the nonresident, provided the causes of action in the two cases are of such a
nature that the judgments or executions can be set off against each other.
A who is domiciled in and a citizen of state Y brings an action against B
in a court of X to recover damages for breach of contract. B brings an
action against A in another court of X to recover damages for a tort and
serves process upon A's attorney. The latter court has jurisdiction over A.
d. If an action is brought in the name of a plaintiff without his authorization, he is not thereby subjected to the jurisdiction of the court.
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Annotation:
Comment a: The law of Missouri is in accord with this comment. Poorman v. Mitchell,
48 Mo. 45 (1871); Coy v. St. L. S. F. Ry. Co., 186 Mo. App. 408, 172 S. W. 446 (1914);
Fulton Iron Works v. Riggin, 14 Mo. App. 321 (1883) (plaintiff a corporation). The following
cases deal with domestic judgments Custer v. Kroeger, 313 Mo. 130, 280 S. W. 1035 (1926);
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 2 S. W. (2d) 115, (Mo. App. 1928); Dittmeierv Laughlin,
253 S. W. 777 (Mo. App. 1923).
Comment b: The law of Missouri is in accord with this comment. R. S. 1929, Sec. 776,
provides that the defendant in his answer may file defenses and counterclaims. Sec. 777
defines the counterclaim mentioned in Sec. 776. Sec. 1285 provides for set-offs and counterclaims in actions on attachment bonds. Most of the decisions do not discuss the question
of jurisdiction. See the cases cited under the above mentioned statutes. See also Martin v.
Jones, 286 Mo. 574, 228 S. W. 1051 (1920). Sec. 849 provides that the dismissal or other
discontinuance of plaintiff's suit, except in a certain class of cases, shall not operate to dismiss
or discontinue a set-off or counterclaim, but the defendant may prosecute the same against
the plaintiff in the same manner and with the same force and effect as if he had originally
begun the action on his set-off or counterclaim against the plaintiff. See the following cases
construing Sec. 849. State ex rel. Bernero v. Mc._uillan, 246 Mo. 517, 152 S. W. 347 (1912);
Lanyon v. Chesney, 209 Mo. 1, 106 S. W. 522 (1907); Cornell v. King, 118 Mo. App. 191,
94 S. W. 822 (1906); Morrison Mfg. Co. v. Roach & Greene, 104 Mo. App. 632, 78 S. W. 644
(1904) (plaintiff a corporation). See also State ex rel. Angold v. Utz, 236 S. W. 386 (Mo. App.
1922).
Comment c: The Missouri statutes do not provide for the method of service mentioned
in Illustration 4, and this comment becomes important only in the determination of the
effect to be given to the judgment of another state.
Comment d: It is held that if an action is brought in Missouri and a judgment of another
state is pleaded or presented as a defense, the plaintiff in the original action may impeach
the judgment by showing that the action brought in the other state was without his authorization. Stuart v. Dickinson, 290 Mo. 516, 235 S. W. 446 (1921); Hays v. Merkle, 67 Mo. App.
55 (1896). Cf. Abernathy v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 287 Mo. 30, 228 S. W. 486 (1920). But a
party cannot attack a domestic judgment collaterally on this ground. Scott v. Royston, 223
Mo. 568, 123 S. W. 454 (1909) (action to sell land for payment of debts). It has been held,
however, that on motion to vacate a domestic judgment a plaintiff may show that the action
brought in the name of the plaintiff was without his authorization.
Cooper v. Armour &
Co., 15 S. W. (2d) 946 (Mo. App. 1929). As to whether a defendant can show that an action
was brought without the plaintiff's authorization, see Riley v. 0' Kelly, 250 Mo. 647, 157
S. W. 566 (1913); Valle v. Picton, 91 Mo. 207, 3 S. W. 860 (1887); Munhall v. Mitchell, 178
Mo. App. 494, 163 S. W. 912 (1914); Robinson v. Robinson, 32 Mo. App. 88 (1888).

Section 90.

Jurisdiction over One Who Acts or Causes Events.

A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual
who has done an act or caused an event within the state, as to a cause of
action arising out of such act or event, if by the law of the state at the time
when the act was done a person by doing the act or causing the event subjects
himself to the jurisdiction of the state as to such cause of action.
Comments:
a.

A defendant in an action who is not present in a state nor domiciled

therein nor a national thereof may subject himself to the jurisdiction of the
state by entering an appearance in the action, even though he does not intend

to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the state (see Section 88).
A foreign corporation by doing business within a state may subject itself
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to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state even though it does not intend sc
to subject itself (see Section 98).
A state may provide that other acts done within the state shall subject
the person doing or causing the acts to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state as to causes of action arising out of such acts even though the person
doing or causing the acts does not intend to subject himself to the jurisdiction.
A judgment rendered against a person who has done or caused such an
act will be recognized as valid in other states provided:
(i) The cause of action upon which judgment was rendered arose
out of the doing of the act, and
(ii) at the time the act was done the law of the state in which the
act was done provided that the doing or causing of the act should subject
him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state.
This principle may be limited in the United States by provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, which are not dealt with in the Restatement
of this Subject.
b. Unless limited by a constitution, a state by its law may absolutely
forbid the doing of designated acts within the state. It may allow such acts
to be done only after the person doing them has expressly agreed to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the state as to causes of action against him arising
out of such acts. A state by its law may provide that the doing of such acts
shall subject the person doing them to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state as to causes of action arising out of such acts. If such a rule of law is in
force in the state at the time when such acts are done within the state, the
person doing such acts thereby subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of such acts, and a judgment
rendered against him after proper notice not merely will be valid in the state in
which it is rendered, but also will be recognized as valid in other states.
The application of this principle to judgments rendered by the courts of the
States of the United States is much limited because of the limitations upon the
power of the States to forbid the doing of acts within the States, imposed by
various provisions of the Constitution of the United States, especially the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the clause relating to interstate commerce, as
shown in Section 91.
Annotation:

Sections 90 and 91 raise a problem upon which there is little authority. No Missouri
decisions have been found on the point. Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760
(1924), aff'd, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927), is the very case stated in
Sec. 91, Illustration2. In Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928)
the Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey statute because no provision was included
requiring notice of the pending action to be sent to the non-resident motorist. See Consolidated etc. Co. v. Muegge, 278 U. S. 559, 49 S. Ct. 17, 73 L. Ed. 505 (1928), applying Wuchrer v.
Pizzuti to a corporation. See also Note (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 949, where the statutes
and decisions dealing with non-resident motorists are collected.
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This basis of jurisdiction has not yet been applied in any other field than the operation
of motor vehicles. It probably is applicable to other acts done within the state involving
danger to life or property. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 356-7, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L.
Ed. 1091 (1927); Note (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 949, 950, note 12. In State v. Slone, 118 Mo.
388, 24 S. W. 164 (1893), it was held that one acting as agent of non-resident individuals
in soliciting and procuring insurance before such individuals have been licensed to do business in Missouri, under R. S. 1889, Sec. 5910, is guilty of a misdemeanor. This decision
is based upon a principle recognized by Sections 90 and 91 of the Restatement, namely,
that although a state may not exclude individuals, it has the power of reasonable supervision
over individuals entering as a matter of right. It would seem that it is reasonable that a
state should have the power to forbid a non-resident individual to engage in the business
of soliciting insurance within the state unless he has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction
by the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of the business, and, furthermore,
that a state should have the power to provide that the doing of such business shall subject
the non resident individual to such jurisdiction even though the non-resident doing such
acts or causing them to be done does not intend to subject himself to the jurisdiction.
For an exhaustive discussion of this theory of jurisdiction, see Scott, Jurisdiction over
Non-Residents Doing Business Within the State, (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 890-91; Burdick, Service as a Requirement oJ Due Process in Actions in Personam, (1922) 20 Mich. L.
Rev. 422; Hinton, Substituted Service of Non-Residents (1925) 20 Il1. L. Rev. 1; Scott,
Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Motorists (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563; GOODRICH ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) pp. 142-46.
Missouri Statutes
The Act regulating motor carrier transportation is of interest in this connection. It
applies to any "person, firm, corporation, lessee, trustee, or receiver operating any motor
vehicle", etc. (R. S. 1929, Sec. 5264). It requires all non-resident applicants for permits to
operate motor carriers within the State to appoint some person or the Secretary of State as
agent for the applicant on which service may be had. (R. S. 1929, Sees. 5271-72). It also
makes provision for service on the secretary of the public service commission. (Sec. 5280).
Suppose a non-resident individual or corporation, without complying, operated a motor
carrier in the State. Could an action be maintained here under Sec. 5280? It would seem
that Sec. 5280 is unconstitutional, for it does not require the official to forward a copy of
the summons to the defendant. Consolidoted, etc. Co. v. Muegge, Wuchter v. Pizzuti, supra.
In State ex rel. Lorantos v. Terte, 23 S. W. (2d) 120 (Mo. 1929), this point was not raised and
it does not appear whether the defendant was a non-resident or not.
Sec. 7735 (R. S. 1929) of the Blue Sky Law is like Sec. 5272. The constitutionality of
such legislation has been upheld. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217, 61
L. Ed, 480 (1917). If a state can forbid a non-resident, whether corporate or not, to engage
in the business of selling securities within the state unless the non-resident has consented to
the exercise ofjurisdiction by the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of such
business, it would seem that a state has the power to provide that the doing of such business
shall subject the non-resident to such jurisdiction without express consent

Section 91.

Effect of Constitutional Limitations.

If a State cannot, without violating the Constitution of the United States,
make the doing of certain kinds of acts within the State illegal unless and until
the person doing the acts or causing them to be done has consented to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the State as to causes of action arising out of
such acts, the State cannot validly provide that the doing of the acts shall
subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State.
Comments:

a.

A State cannot without violating various provisions of the Constitu-
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tion of the United States, such as those relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens of other States or of the United States and those relating
to interstate commerce, absolutely forbid the doing of many kinds of acts
within the State, nor forbid the doing of such acts unless the person doing the
acts or causing them to be done has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the State, even as to causes of action arising out of such acts. If a State,
may not thus indirectly force a person to give consent, it cannot subject him
to the jurisdiction of its courts in the absence of consent.
Illustration:
1. A statute of State X provides that if a contract is made in the
State, service of process may be made in any action for breach of the
contract upon the Secretary of State who shall thereupon mail a copy
of the process to the defendant. A and B makes a contract in X. A brings
an action in a court of X against B for breach of the contract. In accordance with the statute, process is served upon the Secretary of State who
mails a copy of the process, properly addressed, to B who is not within the
State and not domiciled therein nor a citizen thereof. B fails to appear.
The court has no jurisdiction over B.
b. There are acts which the State may make illegal unless consent is
first given to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State as to causes
of action arising out of such acts done within the State.
A State may make illegal the doing of acts which endanger the public
safety unless the person doing the acts first consents to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts ot the State as to causes of action arising out of the doing
of such acts; and a State may further provide that the doing of such acts shall
subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of its courts as to causes of action
arising out of such acts.
Illustration:
2. A statute of State X provides that in an action growing out of the
operation of an automobile within the State by a non-resident service
of process may be made upon a public official, who shall forward a copy
of the process by mail to the non-resident. A, a resident of State Y,
operates an automobile in X and runs into and injures B. B brings an
action in X against A, not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
State, and service of process is made in accordance with the statute. The
court has jurisdiction to render a judgment against A.
c. If a State cannot constitutionally make it illegal for a non-resident
to engage in business within the State unless he has consented to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the courts of the State as to causes of action arising out of
the business, it cannot validly provide that a non-resident by doing business
within the State thereby subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
State.
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Atnnotation:

See Annotations to Section 90.

Section 92. Partnerships or Other Unincorporated Associations.
A partnership or other unincorporated association by doing business
in a state in which the partnership or association may be sued as a legal
person subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the state as to causes of action
arising out of the business there done.
Comments:
a. At common law a partnership or other unincorporated association
is not treated as a legal person distinct from its members. Liabilities incurred
are the liabilities of the members and jurisdiction to enforce such liabilities
depends upon jurisdiction over the members.
In some states by statute partnerships and other unincorporated associations are treated as legal persons. Under these statutes a partnership
or other unincorporated association by doing business within the state subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the state to the same extent to which a foreign
corporation which cannot be excluded from the state subjects itself to the
jurisdiction of the state (see Section 98).
As to what constitutes doing business see Section 179.
b. Although the partnersbip or association is treated as a legal person
in the state in which it did business and in which a judgment is rendered
against it, an action cannot be maintained against it as a legal person upon the
judgment in another state, unless by the law of that state also a partnership
or association is treated as a legal person, and may be sued as such. Under
these circumstances the obligation may be enforced in such other state by
suit against the partners as individuals, using the former judgment as "res
adjudicata" of the facts; or, if such procedure is allowed by the local practice,
by suing the partners upon the judgment against the partnership and obtaining
a judgment payable only out of firm property.
The jurisdiction to enforce the several liability of the individual partners
is determined by the principles stated in Sections 90 and 91.
Annotation:

This section presents a problem upon which there is little authority in Missouri. The
Missouri cases hold that without a statute so providing a partnership or other unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in the common name. See Weldon v. Fisher, 194
Mo. App. 573, 186 S. W. 1153 (1916), holding that one partner has no implied authority
to enter an appearance for his co-partners, so as to subject them to personal liability. See
also Van natia v. Harroun Real Estate Co., 221 Mo. 373, 120 S. W. 738 (1909) (action to
quiet title); State ex rel. v. Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, 211 Mo. 181, 190, 109 S. W.
675 (1908) (suit in equity); State ex rel. v. Staed, 64 Mo. App. 28 (1895); Johnson Machinery
Co. v. Watson, 57 Mo. App. 629 (1894) (attachment suit).
At common law the contract liability of partners was Joint and the plaintiff in a contract action was bound to join all the partners as defendants. Jurisdiction to enforce such
obligations depended upon jurisdiction over all of the partners. Many states have avoided
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some of the hardships resulting from this doctrine by enacting statutes which provide
that the obligation of such a contract is joint and several. This is the situation in Missouri.
R. S. Mo. 1929, Secs. 2953, 2956. See Burdick, Joint and Several Liabilities of Partnerj,
(1911) 11 Col. L. Rev. 101. Under such statutes a creditor may sue any partner or all of
them at his election, provided the partners sued are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Willis v. Barron, 143 Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289 (1898); Gates v.Watson, 54 Mo. 585 (1874);
Oldham v. Henderson, 4 Mo. 295 (1836); Frazierv. Radford, 23 S. W. (2d) 639 (Mo. App.
1926); Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S. W. 1089 (1908); Hodel Mutti Mfg.
Co. v. Ham, 112 Mo. App. 718, 87 S. W. 608 (1905). Even at common law the tort liability
of partners was joint and several.
The condition of a partnership creditor has been greatly improved in some states by the
so-called "Joint Debtor Acts." These acts usually provide that where an action is brought
against two or more joint debtors upon contract, and the summons is served on one or more
but not on all of them, the action may proceed as though all of the joint debtors had been
served; that ajudgment against all of the joint debtors may be entered; and that such judgment shall bind all the joint property and the individual property of the party served. See
1866 N. Y. Laws, c. 824, sec. 5. The same result has been reached in Missouri and in some
other states by judicial decision without the aid of a statute. In Powers v. Braley, 41 Mo.
App. 556 (1890), where the action proceeded "upon a firm obligation" in the absence of a
partner who could not be served, it was held, without the aid of a specific statutory provision,
that the resulting judgment authorized the taking of firm property on execution. In this
case the suit was brought "against the members" of the "firm". Only one partner was
served, but the judgment was "against all the members of the firm." Cf. Frazierv.Radord,
23 S. W. (2d) 639, (Mo. App. 1926) (an equitable garnishment). The constitutional diffi.culties were not discussed in these cases but Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524, 10 S. Ct. 163,
33 L. Ed. 447 (1889) seem to have removed all doubt as to the legality of such practice.
It is clear, however, that such a judgment cannot be a valid personal obligation of a partner
who was not served. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. (U. S.)165, 13 L. Ed. 648 (1850);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877); Restatement, Section 79. As to the
effect of such a judgment in another state, see Magruder and Foster, JURISDICTION OVER
PARTNERSHIPS (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 804.
In Powers v. Braley, supra, the action seems to have been in contract, but there is
nothing in the opinion to indicate that the doctrine of that case is limited to contract actions.
The Joint Debtor Acts apply only to contract actions, and as applied to partnerships, the
judgment is entered against all the partners and not against the "firm". The statutes of'
some states go a step beyond the Joint Debtor Acts and provide a method of general application whereby a partnership may be sued in the firm name and judgment obtained against
the firm. See 1907 Ala. Code, Sec. 2506. Some of these statutes provide that the judgment
may be satisfied only out of firm property; others provide that it may be satisfied out of
firm property and the individual property of the member served.
Missouri Statutes
R. S. Mo., 1929, Sec. 744 is of interest in this connection. This statute provides that
certain associations doing business within the State may be sued "by the name in which they
contract or do business", and jurisdiction acquired by service on any member or agent of the
association, the judgment to bind the association property and the property of all the members of the association. The terms of this statute are broad enough to include tort actions.
It is submitted, however, that it is unconstitutional in so far as it attempts to make the
judgment against the association a personal obligation of the members not served with
process. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, supra; Pennoyer v. Neff, supra. See Wilson v.St. Louis &
S. F. Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S.W. 286 (1891). But Sec. 744 does not afford a method of
general application whereby a partnership or other unincorporated association may be sued
in its firm name and judgment obtained against the association, for it does not apply to
associations composed entirely of individuals. State ex rel. v.Slaed, 64 Mo. App. 28 (1895).
R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 728 is not of such limited application. It provides. "A summons
shall be executed, except as otherwise provided by law, either .
seventh, where any
action shall be commenced against any voluntary or unincorporated association it may be
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sued in the name it has selected or by which it is known or uses and summons may be served
on it by delivering a copy of the writ and petition to the president, or other officer, agent,"
etc. No case has been found involving the application of this provision to a suit against a
partnership. It has been held, however, that it authorizes suits to be brought against certain non-partnership associations in the common name and that it is not necessary 'that all
members of such associations be made parties defendant. McIntyre v. Live Stock Shipping
Ass'n., 11 S.W. (2d) 77, (Mo. App. 1928); Bruns v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 242 S. W.
419 (Mo. App. 1922). See State ex rel. v. Lee, 288 Mo. 679, 233 S. W. 20 (1921); Wiehtuechter
v. Miller, 276 Mo. 322,208 S.W. 39 (1918); Newton Co. Farmers,etc. Exchange v. K. C. So. Ry.
Co., 2 S. W. (2d) 125 (Mo. App. 1928). But the effect of Sec. 728 has been limited by two
recent decisions, one of which was decided before McIntyre v. Live Stock Shipping Ass'n,
supra. In Mayes v. United Garment Workers of America, 320 Mo. 10, 6 S. W. (2d) 333
(1928), the Supreme Court expressed the view that an unincorporated association cannot
be sued in the name it has selected, under subdivision 7 of Sec. 728, unless the association is
otherwise properly constituted a suable entity. The court said that this statute conflicts
with the constitutional requirement that a bill shall contain but one subject, in so far as it
undertakes to constitute voluntary associations suable entities, but that it is not invalid
to the extent that it describes the manner of serving process on such associations otherwise
properly constituted suable entities. In Sys v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 24 S. W. (2d)
1080 (Mo. App. 1930), it was held that a voluntary unincorporated labor union, being a
voluntary association having powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, was suable, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of Sec. 728. This case seems to
adopt the view that an unincorporated association may be sued in the association name and
the summons served on it by delivering a copy to an officer of the association, under Sec.
728, if the association has powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships
and is treated as a suable entity independent of Sec. 728. Unless the Missouri courts hold
that a partnership is a suable entity, independent of Sec. 728, it would seem that a partnership cannot be sued as an entity, for no other statute has been found making a partnership
a suable entity. But the same result may be accomplished under the doctrine of Powers v.
Bradley, supra, if jurisdiction can be acquired over one or more of the partners.
Sec. 729 provides that the seventh subdivision of Sec. 728 "shall apply to and be construed to include common law trusts, or associations operating under a declaration of trust."
No cases have been found involving the application of this provision. Business trusts have
been treated as legal entities in certain fields of the law. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v.
Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 S. Ct. 48, 70 L. Ed. 183 (1925) (taxing statute); Schmidt v.
Stortz, 208 Mo. App. 439,236 S. W. 694 (1922) (blue sky law); Krey PackingCo. v. Wi/dwood
Springs Resort, 4 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (federal Bankruptcy Act); Forgan v.
Mackie, 232 Mich. 476, 205 N. W. 600 (1925) (statute allowing suits in firm name). In
Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 48 S. Ct. 577, 72 L. Ed. 978 (1928), it was held that a
common law trust created under the Massachusetts statutes was a corporation with regard
to its right to do business in another state, and that it must comply with the laws relative
to the necessity of foreign corporations procuring a certificate of authority to carry on business within such other state. See Note (1929 15 Va. L. Rev. 249; Note (1928) 14 Cornell
L. Q. 70; Note (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 86, where the authorities treating such trusts as legal
entities are collected. Since these trusts have powers and privileges not possessed by individuals and have been treated as legal entities for many purposes, it would seem that they
are suable as legal entities, under Sec. 728, even if that section is unconstitutional in so far as
it undertakes to constitute such trusts suable entitles.
In Williams v. U. S. Express Co., 195 Mo. App. 362, 191 S.W. 1087 (1917) the court
held that by virtue of R. S. 1909, Ch. 33, Art. I (R. S. 1929, Ch. 32, Art. I) and R. S. 1909,
Sec. 1760 (R. S. 1929, Sec. 728. subdivision four), the defendant, a foreign joint stock company, could be sued in Missouri as a legal entity. Even if subdivision four, Sec. 728, relating
to joint stock companies, is subject to the same constitutional objection as subdivision seven
of that section (see Mayes v. United Garment Workers o America, supra), the Williams Case
may be sustained on the ground that the court said that a joint-stock company is recognized as a suable entity by R, S. 1909, Ch. 33, Art. I (R. S. 1929, Ch. 32 Art. I), independent
of Sec. 728.
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It will be noted that Sec. 728 does not provide how a judgment against an unincorporated association may be satisfied. This question, as well as many other constitutional
problems raised by Section 92 of the Restatement, has never been discussed by the Missouri
courts. For an exhaustive discussion of these problems, see Holdoegel, Jurisdiction over
Partnerships, Non-Partnership Associations and Joint Debtors, (1926) 11 Iowa L. Bull. 193;
Magruder and Foster, Jurisdictionover Partnerships,(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 793.

